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THE HISTORICAL TEST OF DOCTRINE

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WE are too prone to assume that formulas with which we are familiar have always been current and authoritative. But David Friedrich Strauss well said, "The true criticism of a doctrine is its history." It is hardly more than a century since men realized the implications of the fact that ideas have a history. There has been development of the idea, and consequent change in the formulation; and it is impossible to gain an adequate appreciation of a modern doctrinal statement, unless we know something of the influences which contributed to it. Histories of dogma have multiplied in recent years; and yet it is surprising how comparatively few of the clergy are interested in this fruitful study. In some of the late controversies, nothing has been more obvious than the entire innocence, on the part of many who were most vehement and insistent, of any acquaintance with the subject. Without entering upon debatable ground which would be irrelevant to my special purpose, I should like to give a few illustrations of the value of this historical study, and of the relief which it offers to modern thought.

1. And first it enables us to be critical of our phraseology, and emancipates us from the tyranny of words. Take, for example, two words which have bulked large in controversy, and with which many minds are still obsessed—"Catholic" and "Orthodox." The popular use of both terms is quite misleading. It is generally ignored that they have had a historical definition. In the year 380, the Emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius, in the compact by which the whole Roman Empire became Christian, declared that the Nicene doctrine was the Catholic Faith, and that those who accepted this faith were alone to enjoy the privilege of being known as Catholics. This became the usage until other considerations intervened. Thus Catholic was affirmed to be synonymous with orthodox, so far as doctrine is concerned. Eventually, the East, which was speculative, retained the title of Orthodox, and the West, which was institutional, preferred "Catholic." Moreover, both words connoted *that upon which the church universal has pronounced,* not merely in a council, but by the subsequent assent of the Christian consciousness. Their broad and vague application to all sorts of less significant things thus becomes an abuse of language, and we are free to concentrate our attention upon the really central truths.

Vincent of Lerins, in his *Commonitorium,* devised a test of catholicity which has had great vogue: *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est.* As a positive principle, it is not very useful, for the things so believed have been few indeed; and as a matter of fact it was directed against Augustin's theories of predestination, sin and grace. But negatively the principle is of high value; nothing may be imposed upon the Christian mind and conscience as primitive, catholic, and authoritative, which has *not* been always, everywhere, and by all believed. This at once relieves us of the pressure of many claims. For example, we are able to affirm that the *filioque* clause of the Western form of the Nicene Creed is not catholic. It was inserted by Pope Benedict at the instance of the Em-

peror Henry II in 1014, although a number of local synods had previously accepted it. The Second Council of Nicæa (787) had "through the Son," which is the formula of the Eastern Churches. But a Pope has not the smallest right to alter a Catholic creed, and the phrase remains a mere Western provincialism. It is tragic that the East and West should be divided upon the alternative of "and" and "through," when, as Doctor Pusey says, both meant the same thing, but of which neither probably had any clear intelligible idea.

Before the year 1854 no member of the Roman Church was compelled to believe in the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary on peril of his salvation; nor before 1870 need he subscribe to the infallibility of the Pope, independently of a Council. In those years the two dogmas were promulgated as articles of faith, and the questions were closed. But the lapse of eighteen centuries, during which there was permitted difference of opinion, deprives either of them of the slightest title to being known as catholic. Even if they were true, we may appeal to the propriety of language as to their characterization.

The word "orthodox" comes nearer to the causes of the present unrest, and even more requires strict limitation. If debaters had only accepted the historical significance, we should have been saved from the indiscriminate and ill-tempered use of the epithet "heretic." Heresy is a serious thing, because it is the erection of individual opinion against the universal judgment of the Church. Unless this be our ruling idea, we are exposed to the well-known gibe that orthodoxy is *my* doxy and heterodoxy is the view of any one who disagrees with me. The adoption of the principle, however, enables us to distinguish fact from theory, and to use words accurately. Thus there is no such thing as an orthodox doctrine of inspiration. The church universal has officially said only, "the Holy Ghost . . . who spake through the prophets." There is the affirmation of the fact that there is inspiration in the Scriptures. There have been many theories of the *modus*, the process, *how* it was

accomplished; but not one of them has been endorsed, and not one has any right to be called orthodox—even if true.

Similarly, there is no orthodox doctrine of the atonement. The Church has officially said, " who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate," etc. There is the affirmation of the fact that we owe our salvation to Jesus Christ; but there is no recognition of any of the theories that have attempted to explain the method of Christ's reconciliation. We may follow Origen or Anselm or Abelard or Luther or Grotius or any modern, and we may approach the truth more closely in one case than in another; but in no case are we at liberty to call our theory orthodox, for only the fact has been pronounced upon.

Nor is there an orthodox doctrine of the final destiny of those who die impenitent. The Church has only said, " I believe . . . in the life everlasting." There may be a death everlasting, but the Church has not affirmed it, and majorities do not substantiate the truth. Accordingly we find in history three points of view, with by no means the same number of followers, but with no official endorsement or condemnation of any of them. There has been belief in endless perdition, in the annihilation of the wicked, and in the restoration of all souls. Certainly not all of these can be equally true; but, whichever one we espouse, we are not one whit more orthodox than if we had entertained either of the others. Therefore there are in theology many doctrines which are both true and Christian; but orthodoxy may be ascribed only to those few which have been explicitly and officially recognized.

2. The study of the history of doctrine also reveals that the Creed has been a thing of growth: this has important implications. We are enabled and compelled to distinguish between what is basic and what is subordinate. This is not a disparagement of the latter, but merely an indication of its proper place of precedence. This is seen in the Creed itself. In the clause, " suffered under Pontius Pilate," it is evident that

the name of the procurator is incidental, and the fact of the suffering is basic. The suffering Christ is intimately related to our salvation; the Cross is central in Christianity. But the date of the event, however accurate, has no fundamental significance. The following article, "the third day he rose again from the dead," contains the same obvious distinction. The risen Christ is the demonstration of the Son of God with power, and again may be closely related to our justification; but the Jewish mode of computing the interval after death has no religious value. Similarly with "conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary." The Incarnation is the central fact; the mode of it is subordinate. The record states that the mode was that of a supernatural conception (improperly called the Virgin Birth), though it may not be assumed that this is the only possible mode. But when we compare the large emphasis upon the Incarnation in the New Testament, with the practical ignoring of the manner of it except in four verses in Matthew and Luke, it is not difficult to see that the one is fundamental and the other quite subsidiary. There can be no clearness of thought, unless we realize what doctrines are basic and what are not.

There is a further useful application of this principle. Only those truths are fundamental upon which the church is built, and upon which the Christian experience depends. If they are not absolutely essential to being a Christian, they must be held to be subordinate, even if they are equally true with others. This is the historical ground of liberty of thought within a large realm of theological opinion. It is not necessary to discipleship that one should believe *all* the articles of the Apostles' Creed: e. g., the first clause of the fifth. I understand that Methodists omit "He descended into hell," in their recitation of that Creed; and some Churches use the alternative phrase, "He went into the place of departed spirits." Would any one be so hardy as to say that Christian allegiance was imperiled by such omission? Then we may refer to the ironical

fact that in 1789, when the Prayer Book was adopted for the American Episcopal Church, there was a rubric inserted which permitted any congregation to omit both phrase and alternative. This rubric remained until the revision of 1892; that is, the Episcopal Church witnessed for 103 years that the clause was not needed in the Christian confession.

To take another familiar illustration: there is doubtless a truth of election in the Scriptures, but there are two contrasted views as to its content. On the one hand, there is the idea of Augustin and Calvin, which is found in the Westminster Confession, that individuals are chosen to eternal salvation. On the other is the less common opinion that, not individuals, but communities, are chosen—the church is the elect people, as the Jewish nation was of old; and that the election is not to salvation, but to the privilege of knowing the good news of God in Christ, and of service in bringing the rest to that knowledge. It is not relevant to inquire which of these conceptions is the true one. The point is that the adherents of neither would dream of challenging the Christian status of his opponent. It is an additional instance of the freedom and tolerance gained by distinguishing the basic from the subordinate doctrines.

3. This historical method also enables us to note precisely when a formula emerged. The value of this is that, if it was unknown for centuries before a given date, its subsequent currency can add nothing to its primitive authority. If a severe storm (say) in Blair County should cause the blue Juniata to stain the Susquehanna River yellow from Rockville to Port Deposit, that would be no evidence as to the color of the river in its upper reaches. We know just when it began to be yellow; and so it is important to know just when a theological statement first appeared. The philosophical attempt to explain the manner of the supposed changes in the bread and wine was unheard of before the middle of the ninth century. The name, "transubstantiation," was given to this theory of Paschasius, two centuries later; and it was made the official doctrine of the

Roman Church at the Council of the Lateran in 1215. It is not only an exploded philosophy today, but it is manifestly not a part of the original Christian teaching.

The vague use of the word " sacrament " in early days led to the patristic numeration of two, three, four or more, and seemed to justify Hugh of St. Victor's list of about forty. The sacredness of the number seven induced Peter Lombard in the twelfth century to limit the sacraments to that number, as there were seven virtues, seven deadly sins, and seven orders in the ministry; and this was adopted by the Roman Church. Four of the five ecclesiastical sacraments therefore have no sanction in the thought of the first eleven hundred years of Christian history; they were named too late to acquire any real authority for the modern mind.

Leo XIII denied the validity of Anglican Orders, on the ground that the English bishops did not intend to ordain sacrificing priests, as was shown by their not delivering the paten and chalice (*porrectio instrumentorum*). The bishops made humorous use of the principle we are stating by their reply that, on Leo's own principles, there was not a valid priest in the Roman communion, since there had not been a single ordination by means of the *porrectio* in the first millennium of our era.

Satisfaction was a common word from the time of Tertullian, as describing the effect of alms, prayers, fastings, and the like. It was first applied to the work of Christ in 1098 by Anselm in his *Cur Deus Homo,* and has ever since been one of the leading ideas in the popular doctrine of atonement. But, when it is carefully studied, its antecedents are most unpromising. In its first form it was saturated with concepts derived from Roman law, German feudalism, and the Church's penitential system, and was the obvious outcome of the atmosphere of its time. In later usage, it is juristic, commercial, and purely speculative; in any case, the end of the eleventh century is far too late to discover the original interpretative figure of our Lord's work.

4. Furthermore, this historical test enables us to observe *how* and *why* formulas secured currency. The knowledge of the source is often a helpful criticism of its validity. Here the material for illustration is so abundant that I can only refer to single instances out of many. Much of our theological vocabulary comes from the Latin Fathers, who were usually lawyers. This is the occasion of the legalistic ethics and religion of the Roman Church, from which Protestants have not completely freed themselves. If the Reformers had not been influenced by the Latin thought of a legal status instead of a personal relation, they would never have worked out their artificial theory of "imputation." They conceived of the imputation of Adam's sin to us, then of our sins to Christ, and then of Christ's righteousness to us. These three imputations are a long distance from the Scriptural uses of the term, which are also three: the imputation of sin to the sinner, the non-imputation of sin to the forgiven sinner, and the imputation to us of the righteousness of the faith which we have (Rom. 4: 7, 8, 9, 11).

The Vulgate is the Authorized version of the Roman Church. Its many mistranslations of the Greek have had a mischievous influence upon subsequent theology. From a large number of examples, let me cite one. One of the New Testament conditions of reconciliation is μετάνοια, a change of mind and purpose. This is rendered by *pœnitentia,* "penitence," as a noun, and by "do penance" (*pœnitentiam agite*), as a verb. This is a clear misunderstanding of the Greek verb; and unhappily it has passed over into our usage through the Old French coinage, *repentir,* whence our word "*repentance.*" The result is an almost inveterate definition of repentance as "remorse or sorrow for sin," as we find in such a strong Protestant as Dr. George B. Stevens, in his "Christian Doctrine of Salvation." Now repentance is in no possible way equivalent to sorrow or penitence, and is in no way connected with it, except as an occasional antecedent or consequent. The original word implies a virile moral activity, and it is a great religious loss to

have the experience diluted into an emotion. The difference and also the relation of the Greek and Latin ideas is well illustrated in 2 Corinthians 7: 8-10 (R. V.).

St. Augustin was the most potent theological influence from the early fifth to the nineteenth century. His name is associated with the doctrine of original sin. He was a great saint and a great thinker, but his teaching on this subject and on predestination casts a dark shadow upon the mind and heart of Christians, from which we are just now emerging. He did not by his phrase mean the universality of sin or a hereditary taint from our ancestors. He meant "original *guilt*"; we realistically participated in the sin of Adam, and are personally guilty of his sin, so that we are born under the Divine condemnation. Now both the idea and the phrase are purely of his invention. They are absolute novelties in Christian thought; not a single Father before 400 can be quoted in their favor, as even Calvin admits. Their loathesome corollaries of the damnation of infants and of the essential evil of the sexual relation are the mere callous extremes of cold logic. But his premises are untrustworthy, his conception of human nature is bad psychology, his theory of an universal doom for a sin of which no one was ever conscious is bad ethics, and his ascription of hopeless impotence for good is contrary to the whole of human experience. It is an immense relief to be able to test and criticize such doctrines by their history. One single word sets our minds distant from them by the diameter of the earth, and completely undermines the system: that word is "cooperation." If we believe, with Tertullian and Clement and Chrysostom, that we can cooperate with the grace of God, the coherent Augustinian structure falls to pieces.

Such a study as the foregoing will perhaps seem to many unsettling and dangerous. As to any fear of results, we need only to believe in God who is the Truth, and who was manifested in Jesus Christ who is the Truth. Then will truth be seen as divine, as eternal, as inevitably victorious.

Reid

EXPERIMENTAL CHRISTIANITY AND RIVAL RELIGIONS*

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VI

Of course it is impossible within the limits of this paper, as it was within the former, to tell the whole story of this anticipated development of experimental logic.[10] All that the space at hand allows me to add to my suggestions at the beginning of the preceding section regarding a chain of logical propositions, the most ultimate of which would be the *inductively obtained hypothesis* of the existence of a supernatural God, is a brief reference to Professor Dewey's specifications regarding metaphysical hypotheses in his volume "Essays in Experimental Logic."[11] Professor Dewey is here criticizing the attempt of William James to deal with the question of God from the standpoint of pragmatism. He insists that as James handles this "world-formula" it is not a hypothesis at all, because James seems to accept the *content* and *meaning* of the Christian world-formula as *given,* and therefore can have nothing left to learn by experimentation save the *value* of a "given," *provided* it is accepted as given or *as true.* Professor Dewey urges that experimental logic ceases to be experimental logic the

* Concluded from the January issue.

[10] A paragraph quoted from "Fundamentalism and Experimental Logic," above cited, may help to show the size of this task:

"The application of the logical method of science to Christianity and its whole realm of thought and feeling and life will necessitate first of all the working of that method itself into the form of a systematic logic; and this will involve a new answer to the age-old problem of knowledge, and the construction of a philosophy that will harmonize the metaphysical interests of idealism and realism with the emphasis of empiricism on diversified concretes. And it will mean for Christianity the construction of a new theology, one that will reject as half-baked the modernist 'reinterpretations' that do violence to both history and common sense, and which will itself comprise a new intellectual approach to the events and assumptions, however metaphysical, that underlie historical Christianity—an approach that will insist on honestly testing the credibility of these events and assumptions instead of begging that whole question by either *including* it in one's major premise, as the fundamentalists do, or by *excluding* it, after the manner of the naturalistic modernists." (*American Review,* 3 : 540, September-October, 1925.)

[11] I refer to the chapter "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," pp. 303-329.

moment it is used to bolster up a position that rests on a basic *dogma;* he insists that the only way to be an experimental logician is to hold one's most ultimate assumptions *not* as "givens" or dogmas, but as *hypotheses;* and he goes on to show that they *can be* hypotheses only in case *both meaning and content,* as well as value are at stake and are *still to be verified* by *consequences* observable in the course of experience *after* the particular hypotheses are definitely formulated and applied to the realm intended.

In objecting to Professor Macintosh's attempt to base a theology that he calls an empirical science on a foundation whose admitted dogmatism vitiates the scientific character of his whole system and renders it ultimately dogmatic, I have already indicated my complete agreement with Professor Dewey on this point. When I say that I am presenting the Christian conception of God *as a hypothesis,* I certainly do not mean that I am trying to determine by experimentation the *value* of a conception whose *content* and *meaning* are *not hypothetic* because they are *given in advance* as true. That would be *experimentation,* but it *would not be experimental LOGIC.*

We have already seen that the presentation of an ultimate or metaphysical conception like that of a supernatural God, by means of the logical device of hypothesis, would require the formulation of many hypotheses. We have noted likewise that all of these hypotheses must be consistent with one another or mutually coherent; and, because of the fact that they all predict, severally, but more obviously when we take them as a system, *what men will find* in a certain area of their individual and social experience, it follows that some of these hypotheses, without for a moment losing their coherence with the basic hypothesis that such a God exists, must have *immediate and concrete application in every-day life.* This is precisely what I mean by the *logical chain* that is metaphysical at one end and concretely and practically experimental at the

other; it will consist of the basic hypothesis of God plus a full and explicit development of its verifiable consequences.

A detailed portrayal of this logical chain, or the systematic presentation of Christianity according to the specifications of experimental logic, would be no less than a complete edition of experimental theology. Obviously this is beyond the scope of the present paper. Furthermore, this theological phase of the enterprise must await the construction of the general logical, epistemological, and philosophical foundation that is prerequisite to it. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate a little of the context which I conceive to be implied by the sample links quoted in section IV above. In this larger context I look for our hypotheses to fall into certain classes:

1. A group of hypotheses would be devoted to predicting *what* God may be in character, nature, etc. They would not, however, pretend to exhaust this subject. Their aim would not be to tell what God is to himself; rather would they limit their prediction to those elements of God's nature or character which might be expected to mean something in human experience. Into this group would fall such hypotheses as: God is Ultimate Reality; he is Creator of all things other than himself and is therefore supernatural; he is interested in his creation; his beneficent and benevolent character, coupled with his wisdom, would lead his interest to manifest itself by this and that particular means, such as entering into man's empirical world in sufficiently objective manner to make himself and his teachings knowable and experimentally verifiable by men.

2. Another group of hypotheses, such as all four of the sample links just mentioned, would deal with God's relation to men. Here, perhaps, there would be room for, and the necessity of, the greater number of the hypotheses that would compose our system of experimental theology.

3. It is apparent that these two groups of hypotheses are intimately interrelated both severally and as groups. Like-

wise are they all so directly related to another hypothesis that it seems fitting to place this one in a class by itself. I refer to the basic hypothesis that *this kind of God actually exists.*

I think it is the undeniable difficulty of dealing with this latter hypothesis that leads so many of our ablest thinkers today to choose the second mode of procedure named in section V above, and to consider as the sheerest romancing any attempt to begin, as I do, from the fourth mode of procedure there specified. I do not wonder at their attitude. The *difficulty is real;* and scientific method has as yet learned how to prepare for testing and actually to test only single hypotheses or relatively isolated groups of hypotheses such as those coherently concerned chiefly with this or that specific science. *Looked at from the standpoint of this piecemeal technique, this dogmatically pluralistic conception of experimental logic, the hypothesis that a supernatural God exists is utterly meaningless and altogether untestable and unverifiable because unrelated, and* (by this piecemeal logic) *unrelatable, to the rest of experience.* This is why I have insisted that the *first* thing to do is to *develop* scientific method to the point where it will be a *comprehensive system of experimental logic that will not be obliged to revert to prescientific dogmatism when it reaches its own basic or metaphysical presuppositions.*

Now let those to whom I may have succeeded in conveying a little of what I have in mind regarding the systematic application of experimental logic to the social sciences, look again at this hypothesis of God's existence *in the setting that I have suggested for it.* Here we would not be testing the bare hypothesis of God's existence. We should first have worked out the logical relation of that hypothesis to other questions relevant to it; and all of these we should have framed *as hypotheses* and should have specifically stated their relation to the main hypothesis. Meaningless as it is to talk of experimenting with the isolated hypothesis of God's existence, we embark upon a course charged with deepest meaning as

soon as we reason our way through to a full understanding that what we are seeking to test in experience is the hypothesis that there exists a *particular kind of God,* with a *definite relation to the world* and a *definitely defined character,* a character which, if such a God exists at all, *would lead him to enter actively into human life* [12] (both historical, current, and future) *for the purpose of teaching men* more excellent philosophy and logic and ethics and religion than might be possible for them on the basis of a world-view that, *simply because of its lack* of knowledge of a God who is Ultimate Reality, *would rest ultimately* on the *practically materialistic metaphysics* of holding some form or phase of the *natural universe itself as Ultimate Reality.*

In short, I am not proposing that we experiment with the hypothesis of a supernatural God who is or has remained aloof from the natural world of our experience. That sort of a God would not only be unknowable by humans, but he would also be *useless* to humans. I am proposing, rather, that we test experimentally a world-view that must first be *obtained by induction from facts,* and then be *logically developed into a system,* the *whole of which is hypothetic* in the *most literal sense of that term;* that is, we should *not pretend to know* in advance a single thing about this world-view, either as to the *existential reality,* the *content,* the *meaning,* or the *value,* which we should ascribe to our concept of God. All of these

[12] It will be objected that in so far as a supernatural God enters into the natural world of human life and is there known by men, he ceases to be supernatural to the human knower. Granted. Finite human beings will never know God *as supernatural;* they will never know him as he knows himself; absolute knowledge is beyond them in this realm no less than in all scientific fields. I am suggesting only that once we shall have thought through the logical problem of the relation of the New Testament conception of a God who is interested to show men how to learn the way of the more abundant life—thought it through sufficiently to be able to *connect* this conception of God with *concrete moral and social programs,* in a way comparable to that in which scientists connect their experimental programs with such basic assumptions as the dependability of nature—I am suggesting that after experimental logic shall have been thus elaborated, adapted, and applied to the field of the social sciences, we may find it possible to *know God* as the *basic presupposition of morality* in the *same PRACTICAL way* that we know the dependability of nature as the *basic presupposition of science.* This practical knowledge is all that science needs to control nature and dominate the thoughts of present-day humanity; and I suggest that we experiment with similar knowledge in the moral and social realms, knowledge that will relinquish all claim to dogmatic certainty and will seek justification only through its consequences in leading men decisively forward toward an era of justice and brotherhood in all departments of human life.

would be at stake in the vast experiment which we humans would be making. We should be seeking, in most humbly teachable fashion, to learn *whether or not* the Christian philosophy of life is true in the sense of being based on an accurate conception of things as they are.

VII

It is at this juncture, which Professor Haydon clearly foresaw as being involved in my previous article, that he criticizes me again:

> Some of these "contents" are such that to be tested they must be acted upon in complete confidence, in which case they may *seem to produce* their own verification, as I might verify an hypothesis that a certain man was my enemy by acting toward him *as if* he were an enemy. The whole process of testing such vital "contents," if it could be carried out, might be tragic.

I grant the point without reservation. Certainly the issue is momentous and the risk is therefore great when human beings choose the world-view that is to serve as the foundation for their philosophy of life; and assuredly no tragedy could equal that which might well result from a mistake at this point. What I fail to see is how Professor Haydon thinks he avoids this risk of tragic error when he chooses, in preference to the supernatural God of Christianity, "an hypothesis grounded on the known facts of religious history" in general. It cannot be denied that he is assuming the responsibility of a choice no less than I am. He elects to construct his philosophy of life and of religion without reference to a God who is greater than nature; in fact, he tells us that this God is dead.[13] But in rejecting this world-view, all he can do is to put another in its place. To say that it is meaningless to speak of a Cause or Ground back of the cosmic process as we experience that process in social and physical nature, is to find the Ground of

[13] Compare an article entitled "The Theological Trend of Pragmatism," *American Journal of Theology*, 23: (local citation) 409 (October, 1919).

the natural universe *within* nature itself. It is to take the natural universe, or some phase of it, as ultimate—as one's world-view.

Assuredly a hypothesis so ultimate as the hypothesis that a supernatural God exists may *seem to produce its own verification.* But let him who counts this a reason for rejecting that hypothesis take note of the fact that the contrary view that such a God does not exist is *equally subject to that limitation.* He who chooses to formulate his philosophy on *any world-view whatsoever* will find that that basic principle may, through the philosophy constructed under its guidance, seem to produce its own verification. Science, for instance, tends to verify the view of the world upon which it is based: that of "nature as a mathematical-mechanical object." [14]

We are forced to conclude, then, that this far-reaching influence of ultimate principles in their own behalf arises from their *ultimacy,* the fact that they *are* world-views, rather than from the particular kind of world-views they happen to be. Therefore, if Professor Haydon would have us avoid all semblance of preconception in favor of our world-views, he must advise us to forego all world-views; he must deprive us of all metaphysics and sentence us to careers of dabbling in superficialities. All of which is, of course, impossible, for it collides head-on with some of the deepest-seated traits of human nature. Whether it be for his weal or woe, and however tragic may be the consequences of possible error, man *will have* a world-view of some kind. He cannot think or feel or choose, being what he is and living in the kind of world in which he finds himself, without implicit reference to it.

Thus it is the part of wisdom *to admit* the tendency of all world-views to incline their adherents in their favor; for it is possible to make allowance for a preconception that is frankly and consciously admitted to be a preconception. Our system of experimental logic can take account of this fact

[14] The phrase is Dewey's. Compare "Experience and Nature," p. 131.

along with all other relevant facts. To pretend, however, and to allow oneself to believe, that he can avoid such preconceptions by forswearing all world-views in favor of which men have ever dogmatized and fleeing to other world-views that are still so new that systematic dogmatism in their behalf has not yet had time to get into action—this is both the beginning and the end of folly. He who thinks that any world-view, by its newness or its intrinsic nature or content, can save him from dogmatism is most likely to fall before the temptation to dogmatize. He cannot guard himself against it because he has not learned that dogmatism arises *not* from the subject-matter of one's world-view, but from his *logical method of holding it*.[15]

VIII

This exposition of experimental logic applied to one of the great religions of the world, although it is by no means sufficiently detailed to do justice to the complexity of the subject, must serve as a basis for our next step: that of considering what this *undogmatic logic* is in a position to do for all religions with respect to their contacts with one another. Here again we find Professor Haydon's criticism most suggestive. Note his statement: "Of course you are not assuming that if there is a God he is the Jewish-Christian God."

Here there is an ambiguity in the word "assume." One may assume *dogmatically,* or he may assume *hypothetically.* Likewise there are two aspects to each of these ways of assuming; that is, each has a *positive* and a *negative* side.

One assumes *dogmatically* when he holds the subject-matter of his assumption to be *given* or absolutely true. A

[15] Concerning this tendency of world-views to prejudice holders in their favor, note the trenchant words of Professor Dewey: "Now the moment the complicity of the personal factor in our philosophic valuations is recognized, is recognized fully, frankly, and generally, that moment a new era in philosophy will begin. We shall have to discover the personal factors that now influence us unconsciously, and begin to accept a new and moral responsibility for them, a responsibility for judging and testing them by their consequences. So long as we ignore this factor, its deeds will be largely evil, not because *it* is evil, but because, flourishing in the dark, it is without responsibility and without check. The only way to control it is by recognizing it." "Essays in Experimental Logic," p. 327.

positive case of dogmatic assumption is illustrated by traditional theology's conception of God, and, as we have seen, it shuts out all other possibilties. For other illustrations of positive dogmatic assumption we may take the customary attitude of any other religion toward its God. The faithful adherents of all these religions believe their chosen faith to be the true one, and, as we saw in section II, the logic by which they defend their respective faiths *lacks a technique for testing the truth of basic assumptions* no less than does the logic of traditional Christian theology. Owing to this fact they inevitably hold their conception of God as dogmatically or absolutely *true.*

For cases of *negative* dogmatic assumption we have but to note the attitude of the orthodox in any of these religions toward religions not their own.

Turning to *hypothetic* assumptions: here one states the particular subject-matter in which he happens to be interested in the form of a definite *hypothesis,* or, if the subject-matter be sufficiently complex, in a *set of hypotheses,* for the purpose of determining experimentally whether or not the subject-matter so presented is true in the sense of being a practically dependable description of reality. This is of course hypothetic assumption in its *positive* form; and for an illustration of it I have but to refer to my own proposal that Christianity be presented in a set of hypotheses that will set forth its content, certainly including its own world-view, in sufficiently definite fashion to enable us to learn by experience whether or not Christianity is true.

Hypothetic assumption in its *negative* form refers to the attitude which one who undertakes to test a particular set of hypotheses is obliged to take toward assumptions that are contrary to the subject-matter of these hypotheses. But the difference between this and the negative side of dogmatic assumption is most important. Not having assumed his hypothetic subject-matter *as true,* the experimental logician cer-

tainly does not need to hold assumptions contrary to it *as false*. Indeed he *cannot,* as I shall explain in greater detail shortly, hold them *as false* without giving up the last shred of his experimental logic even with respect to its use in the positive presentation of his own position; for he would thereby *convert* his own positive hypothetic assumptions into positive *dogmatic* assumptions.

In drawing these distinctions between dogmatic and hypothetic assumptions, however, I have greatly oversimplified the tangled web in which we find these two kinds of assumptions intermeshed in practically every phase of intellectual life today. Not even among orthodox Christian theologians do we find none but strict dogmatic assumptions. They have certain *specific* assumptions that are held in apparently quite hypothetic fashion. Doubtless similar statements would be true of most of the other great religions. But note this fact: In all these religions (including Christianity as interpreted by traditional theology) the *ultimate assumptions* are dogmatic; and by virtue of the logical sway of ultimate assumptions or propositions over all those that lie between them and the concrete end of the logical series, the *dogmatic character* of the ultimate assumptions *devours* the hypothetic character of the specific assumptions deductively related to them, a process that renders the whole system dogmatic in spite of any specific pretensions its advocates may make to the contrary.

Turning to the natural sciences we find a situation not greatly different. Nearly all scientists pride themselves in being empirical in their thinking; and so they are with respect to questions arising within their several fields. I do not hesitate to characterize these *specific* assumptions of the scientists as truly hypothetic. But look at the more general or ultimate assumptions that logically underlie the thought of every scientist, such as the *existence* of their respective fields. To how many scientists is this assumption, with all its metaphysical companions, other than *dogmatic?* Indeed it is the dog-

matism of the scientists at this basic point that has misled so many modernists in Christianity and the field of comparative religions to congratulate themselves on being *scientific* when as to their underlying principles they are as dogmatic as ever. Now, having concluded that the basic dogmatism of traditional theologians vitiates any hypothetic element which might otherwise be found in specific cases of experimentation among them, what shall we say of scientists, and of modernists in whatever religion, when we discover that they have *not yet applied the experimental method* that they use *within* their chosen fields *to the basic or metaphysical assumptions that underlie these fields?* We cannot escape the conclusion that here too every hypothetic assumption that rests logically on a more ultimate assumption that is not also hypothetic, is thereby rendered ultimately dogmatic.

All these are reasons why I urge the necessity of elaborating experimental logic so as to make it applicable to metaphysics. I see no way of avoiding the dogmatism that is bound to flow from our basic assumptions, so long as these are dogmatic, except by applying to them the logic that has enabled us to hold specific assumptions as *hypotheses.* To say the very least, this is a step that we should profit greatly by taking, if, by it, we should learn how to elevate our answers to basic questions, answers which we cannot avoid making either expressly or by implication, from the status of dogmatic assumptions to that of *hypothetic* assumptions.

It follows from the very nature of hypothesis as a logical device that no one can hold an ultimate concept like that of the existence of a supernatural God *as a hypothesis* except by virtue of his honest recognition of all possible contraries to that concept as *possible alternatives* to his God. The same is true of Christianity as a whole. He who devotes himself to presenting Christianity in hypothetic form, in order that he and his fellows may test its truth experimentally, *utterly precludes himself,* by virtue of his choice of logical method, *from*

ruling out other religions. In the event that he should ever be so weak as to do so, by that very act he *would surrender his own logic* and degrade the basic assumption of Christianity from the status of hypothesis to that of dogma; for he can maintain the hypothetic and undogmatic logical character of his chosen religion only by conceding to representatives of all other religions the possible truth of one or more of their positions and the consequent falsity of his own.[16]

It is now possible for me to put quite concisely my reply to this point in Professor Haydon's criticism. In my proposed presentation of Christianity according to the hypothetic method of experimental logic I *am assuming HYPOTHETICALLY* that if there is a God he is the Jewish-Christian God. I insist on the right of Christians to do this simply because there is no other way, known by men at present, by which the truth or falsity of Christianity and its view of the world may be determined. Let no one forget, however, that I am *just as emphatic,* in my insistence that Christians must *not allow a single one* of their mutually coherent set of hypothetic assumptions to *degenerate* into a dogmatic assumption, as I am in my plea that Christians should stand fast on their clear right to formulate the contents of their faith in as many hypotheses both ultimate and specific as may turn out to be necessary for a thoroughgoing experimental test.

In addition to this, let no one overlook my explicit argument that Christians can maintain the logical status of hypothesis for their own religion *only by the fullest concession* of this same right to the adherents of every other religion. Indeed no Christians, who catch the spirit of the logic I am advocat-

[16] Compare Bosanquet, "Logic," (Second Edition) Vol. II, Chapter V, local citation, p. 151; also Sellars ("The Essentials of Logic," p. 197) who there states the point quite concisely: "An hypothesis is any conception by which the mind goes beyond the known facts and seeks to establish relations between data of testimony and perception, *so long as that conception is one among alternative possibilities* and is not considered a fact." (Sellars italicizes all of this; I have left in italics only the clause relating to the point before us.)

Dewey has the same thought in "How We Think," p. 75: "Since suspended belief, or the postponement of a final conclusion pending further evidence, depends partly upon the presence of rival conjectures as to the best course to pursue or the probable explanation to favor, *cultivation of a variety of alternative suggestions* is an important factor in good thinking."

ing, will be content with the results of any test of their own faith that is not set alongside of an equally fair and scientifically accurate experimental test of the whole subject-matter, including its metaphysical presuppositions, of every other religion that is in any sense close in its rivalry with their own. To this end they will earnestly request the advocates of these other religions to set themselves to the task of translating their several positions into hypothetic form so that each may have the most unbiased experimental test. Christians who have adopted the method of experimental logic will be confident that unlimited experimentation is man's best way of learning to distinguish truth from error; and hence, so long as the method used is the fair one of experimentation fairly conducted, they will be as eager to learn the possible truth of other religions and the consequent possible falsity of their own, as the reverse. They would earnestly regret to see other religions retain a dogmatic logic while they were engaged in reinterpreting Christianity and testing its truth by experimental logic, not because this would hinder their own enterprise, but because the triumph of *experimental* Christianity over rivals that were content to remain dogmatic would be *fictitiously easy*. Christians who grasp the meaning and the value of experimental logic would not be content with any comparison of their faith with other religions except one that was based on the best fruits which any and every religion might produce unhandicapped by ancient and outworn logic. They would be wise enough to see that a fictitiously easy triumph would be ultimately weakening to any religion that might achieve it.

Therefore the counsel of experimental logic to the adherents of all rival religions is simply that the race is to the swift and the victory to the strong. The application of the hypothetic method of the logic of science to the metaphysical presuppositions underlying all religions would *destroy the roots* of dogmatism in any religion whose advocates might

choose that method for the propagation of their faith. This logic would teach them that the only way by which they might intellectually justify the ultimate presuppositions of their religion would be by presenting these *as hypotheses* and connecting them with the facts of experience by means of logical steps which would also be hypothetic. From these considerations it follows that the adherents of any religion could learn the truth of their faith only by observing what fruits it might bear as a result of such a process of honest experimentation, and that they could hope to learn its excellence as compared with other religions only in case these rivals should also be allowed the freest scope to show what their respective experimental results might be. Thus would experimental logic teach that that religion will be counted true and will be accepted by future centuries in the cosmopolitan world that is to come, which can first and *best* teach men its truth by combining logic and laboratory in the discovery and verification of its kinship with both practical and Ultimate reality. It would plead for a fair field and no handicaps, a field upon which all religions might be free to do their utmost in a *competition of greatest service,* secure in the confidence that that religion which could serve humanity best, would by that service teach mankind that it is the greatest and truest of all.

IX

One consideration that has already received incidental mention remains before us for explicit treatment. As presented by its advocates in both word and deed there is no established religion of the present time that commends itself as even approximately free from error. All of them, when judged by the interpretations of their leaders and measured by concrete results, fall short in certain important particulars from the ethical ideals of those most awake to the spiritual and social needs of the twentieth century. From this fact some of the most loyal humanitarians of our time have con-

cluded that none of the historic religions is or can become adequate to meet the ethical requirements of the present and future, and that we must adopt the eclectic procedure of gleaning truths and rejecting errors from all of the great religions. It is urged that out of these ethical gleanings we ought to be able to construct an *inclusive religion* that will meet the moral and spiritual requirements of humanity better than we can possibly expect any one of the several historic religions to do.

This view is perhaps entitled to special consideration in our study of rival religions, for it is the conclusion which many of the most diligent students of comparative religion have felt obliged to accept as a result of their close acquaintance with the ethical heights reached by several of the great religions. It seems to be the view that Professor Haydon has in mind when he urges me to get "an hypothesis grounded on the known facts of religious history."

It is obvious that we have here the prenatal quickenings of *another religion.* What its future may turn out to be, no one can say; but I do not hesitate to make one prediction regarding its prospects: I predict that every decade during which the established religions retain their traditional dogmatic logic, they will contribute many of their choicest spirits as apostles of the new religion.

It is obvious also that this new religion *implies* a world-view that will eventually become *explicit.* It is frankly naturalistic, although its naturalism has not yet been traced to its ultimate metaphysical basis. It rejects the claims of supernatural sanction wherever it finds these in all the historic religions. Consequently its *basic metaphysical presupposition* can be no other than some phase or interpretation of the natural universe itself. I am not saying that this will be its God; its conception of God is more apt to be *Humanity,* or perhaps some symbolization of the *Spirit* or *Common Will* of Humanity; but neither of these would be a metaphysical con-

ception and would therefore logically rest on some more ultimate proposition.

It is apparent, from the plea made in the preceding section in behalf of a fair field for all historic religions, what would be the attitude of experimental logic toward a religion about to be born. It would extend a hand of heartiest welcome to the new religion of Humanism that seems to be implied in Professor Haydon's criticism. Speaking from the personal standpoint of a Christian whose major plea is simply that his fellow Christians should cease all forms of dogmatism and present their faith by a frank and utterly unreserved use of experimental logic, I may add my own most royal second to this welcome. Only one possible eventuality could make the new religion superfluous, and that would be: First, the general adoption, by all of the great religions, of scientific method developed into a logic that could cope with the metaphysical questions that are implicit in them all; and, second, the possible result from this general experimentation, that some one of our present religions should prove by its fruits that it is essentially and practically the only true and wholy satisfactory religion. Until this shall be accomplished, however, the newcomer has and will have an important service to perform: it may continue to dissolve the haze left by historic dogmatism as to the relative virtues and vices of all the established religions, and may thereby reveal how great is the need that all men should outgrow dogmatic habits of thinking.

The new religion may well perform a great service in challenging the adherents of other religions to set their houses in order, even though its own advocates should not themselves learn to walk in the way of undogmatic logic. But I am convinced that its service would be infinitely greater if its proponents would themselves achieve a logic that would enable them to think their own position through to a full realization of the metaphysical world-view that is implied by it, and then

to present their whole platform, undergirded by none other than its own world-view, in a *set of hypothetic assumptions* whose truth men would be asked to accept only in terms of long-run consequences.

To be specific: Is his own position, on the basis of which Professor Haydon criticizes my proposal that Christianity renounce every vestige of dogmatic logic and present its whole content according to the specifications of experimental logic, a set of hypotheses that are *all hypothetic,* or is it a set of hypotheses *resting ultimately* on a *dogma?* If his position is hypothetic clear down to its ultimate metaphysical principle, then he will welcome my presentation of a supernatural alternative to his own naturalistic world-view, for this is essential to his maintaining the hypothetic character of his whole system. Certainly he will not rule this alternative out by insisting that the only way to "save time and ages of testing" is by adopting his view from the outset. There is only one possible alternative to a proposition so basic as that which holds nature or some phase of it to be Ultimate Reality; and that is the view that the natural universe is not metaphysically ultimate because it has been created by, and finds its Ground in, a Reality more ultimate yet—that is, a supernatural God. Thus it follows from the logical device of hypothesis, as we have seen that intellectual tool expounded by thinkers as supreme in this field as Bosanquet, Sellars, and Dewey [17]—I refer to their teaching that a proposition forfeits its hypothetic status and becomes a dogma the moment that its proponents lose sight of all possible alternatives to it and hence slip into the belief that it is the only possible view—it follows that Professor Haydon's *naturalistic* world-view can be a hypothesis, and thus preserve his whole system from becoming ultimately dogmatic, only in so far as he is *actually able to think in terms of a supernatural God* as a possible alternative to his own basic assumption.

[17] See above, page 151, especially footnote 16.

Summary and Conclusion

1. Dogmatic methods of thinking must be rejected in all religions, in all branches of social science, and (it is necessary to add) in the physical and biological sciences.

2. The undogmatic technique of experimental logic, which is simply a refinement and development of scientific method even as scientific method is itself refined and disciplined common sense with augmented powers of observation, should be substituted for dogmatic procedures of all kinds.

3. This universal application of scientific method would require the development of that method itself to fit the broader subject-matters which comprise the field of the social sciences. Just as biologists found it necessary to recast scientific method, as they had borrowed it from the physical sciences, in order to render it adequate for their task of studying living organisms, so is it essential further to develop and adapt that method to the still more complex subject-matter of human affairs and interests, if we are to use it in the social sciences.

4. The development of scientific method into a thoroughgoing and systematic experimental logic, to the end of its application to the field and subject-matter of the various social sciences, makes necessary likewise its development for, and application to, the realm of the *basic assumptions* or *presuppositions* of *all* sciences, a realm which we may designate as the field of metaphysics. This is a point of crucial importance because of the fact that unless these presuppositions are also brought under the domain of scientific method, and are thereby converted into hypotheses, they will *remain dogmas;* and by virtue of their basic position in the scientist's chain of reasoning they would, if allowed to remain dogmas, tinge his whole procedure with dogmatism and render its scientific character nothing but a mask and cloak.

5. Obviously such an extensive elaboration and development of scientific method is a task that will require the most de-

voted efforts of the best minds for centuries to come. I venture to make but one requisition concerning it: It must be accomplished *inductively* and by *piecemeal* rather than deductively and by wholesale. We shall make little headway if we attempt to devise a scientific logic for the social sciences *in general.* We must, rather, learn from the concrete endeavors of those pioneers in the physical and biological sciences, whose devotion to specific problems has brought scientific method to its present stage of development, that it is just as essential for social scientists to work concretely in restricted phases of this social science or that, to which their individual aptitudes may call them (myself in Christianity, for instance); and that they should leave the final summary to a later century, which, by virtue of their researches, may find itself provided with data requisite for a logic of the social sciences expounded in general terms.

Read

THE PLACE OF MORALITY IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL

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It is surprising to discover how little attention has been paid to the ethical teachings of the apostle Paul in the thousands of volumes that have been written on different phases of his life and thought. Matthew Arnold remarked, not entirely without cause, that the controversy on justification by faith had flooded the world with an ocean of verbiage. The γάρ's and the δέ's have been painstakingly studied in the effort to observe their importance in Paul's theological dictums. Nor has this been without profit. The grandeur of Paul's thought amply repays all study, and each rereading discovers beauties hitherto unnoted. This makes the almost entire absence of work on the ethical teachings the more amazing. Perhaps it may not be too rash to hazard the guess that one reason scholars have not devoted more energy to this phase of New Testament study is that they have felt it would be too simple; that all one would need do would be to gather together the groups of disjointed precepts at the ends of the various epistles. And so they have turned from this very fruitful field to wrestle with Paul's arguments, of which the conclusions are as lucid as the reasons are obscure.

To relegate Paul's ethical teaching to the background of his thought is to misunderstand the apostle completely. Percy Gardner has aptly remarked in his book "The Religious Experience of St. Paul," p. 139:

> In that epistle [i. e., Romans] he is mainly bent as in the Corinthian Epistles he is almost entirely bent upon what is ethical, what has relation to conduct, and to human love and hope. He drifts into a doctrinal discussion, I had almost said a doctrinal slough, because it lies directly in his path. But he is not happy there, nor do I think that he there shows at

his best. And it is with obvious relief that he goes back to his ethical exhortation.

The debt Christianity owes to Paul is threefold, and in each part has to do with human conduct. As against the Jew Paul insisted upon freedom from the Law. In protest against the laxity in morals in the Hellenistic world he stressed the sturdy Jewish morality with its insistence on the purity of family life. Nor were these two all. In addition to them he struck the note of κοινωνία, fellowship, not alone with the Lord—the Oriental cults taught that—but with the fellow believers. The Greek speculative systems were woefully weak here with little or no attempt to organize their followers into local groups or to stimulate them to life. In this field Paul was a pioneer. Jesus had had no thought of founding individual groups or of establishing a new society. His aim had been the purification of the national spirit; his challenge, "Repent, for the kingdom of Heaven is at hand."

Paul formed an organic entity bound by the closest of ties to a living source whose members would mutually stimulate one another to the utmost. His plan worked. Certain excrescences have been sloughed off, but his principle was sound, and his work has lasted. Today there is much talk of "going back to Jesus." In all reverence it may be stated that had it not been for Paul or some one like him at that critical day there is good reason to believe there would never have been any Christianity. Regardless of the intrinsic worth of teachings, unless people know them they can exert little influence.

Perhaps the canons of ethics will seem to be broken in the form in which Paul's teaching is discussed. It may be objected, for example, that religion and ethics are not differentiated with sufficient clearness. My only apology is that I question whether Paul would have understood the criticism. For him morals and religion were indissolubly united, if not actually identical, though it was his lifelong task to get his churches to realize it.

By faith in Christ and the power of his resurrection the Christian came into immediate fellowship with his Lord. He was baptized into his death, and thus leaving behind his old sinful nature was raised into newness of life. He had died to the flesh, characterized and dominated by all its lusts, and henceforth lived to the spirit. Thus he actually became a new man in Christ Jesus. He had been consecrated, set apart, by baptism, but this rite though important did not have the same magical effectiveness as did the similar initiatory rites of the other cults. In them it was sufficient. By his initiation in the cults the devotee learned " the secret " by the aid of " the things done and the things said "; accordingly salvation was unconditionally assured him. The Christian rite was in a measure similar in that it too plunged the initiate into mystic union with the risen Lord, by the impartation of whose spirit a new life began, yet that was not all. His life must conform to his new exalted status of being ἐν χριστῷ, i. e., mystically and intimately united with Christ. By this union he was assured a place in the eternal destiny of the world, in the new age soon to be ushered in. Death, should that come before the dawn of the new age, would have no effect save that of bringing the Christian into an even closer union freed from any danger of relapse into sin—a danger all too real, as Paul knew to his sorrow.

But this glorious destiny was only for those who actually lived ἐν χριστῷ. To be sure good works as such, keeping of the Law and the like, could not grant this boon; it must come as the free gift of God to be appropriated by the Christian's faith, yet this faith was by no means a mere intellectual assent. It was actually a new life where the flesh was in subjection to the spirit and brought forth fruits evidencing the fact that the man was righteous before God. For Paul morality, far from being of no consequence as it was for the other mysteries, was directly resultant from his doctrines of salvation through faith. The Christian was impelled toward a certain kind of life, by virtue

of his union with his Lord. If he was really ἅγιος[1]—consecrated, separate, set apart to God—to Paul's mind he must inevitably show it; if he was really yoked to Christ he must live in a fitting way. The exalted position he held as actually "in his Lord," and with his Lord dwelling in him[2] could not fail to bring him to the full stature of the perfect man. As a recent writer has expressed it

> in Christianity a character conformed to God's own is the consequence of the grace of God in Jesus Christ, through the Holy Spirit. The possession of such a character is therefore the criterion of the genuineness of man's faith and the reality of his union with Christ.[3]

This was the gospel which he had been called to preach. It was at once his duty and his joy to make it known to all men. He was not ashamed of it, for it was the power of God to salvation to all who accepted it. His task was to strive in every possible way to offer this gospel to men that they would accept it; that he might present all men faultless in Christ Jesus; that at the great day of Judgment when all men stood before the judgment-bar, it might be not a day of wrath but a day of salvation. To attain this he would go to all extremes. Though free through the power of Christ's death, yet he gladly made himself a slave to all that he might win all for Christ. Though a free man he rejoiced that he was privileged to be Christ's slave in this glorious task. Nothing else in life counted; the most prized possessions of life—high birth, a noble ancestry, a rich heritage—of which he had been proud, he now gladly

[1] The fundamental concept is "rendered or declared holy," i. e., set apart to God, and so refers to a religious status rather than a moral characterization. So ὁ ἅγιος was not necessarily a perfect man—though Paul would say he ought also to be—but one in religious connection with God. Some argue that in Romans 12: 1 (cf. Sanday, ICC, in loc.) ἁγίαν is used of moral purity, and cite 1 Peter 1: 16 and Leviticus 19: 2 as evidence for its use in such a sense. But it should be noted that in 1 Peter 1: 16 the author is quoting the LXX rather than choosing ἅγιος for what it independently would have conveyed, and that the emphasis is not on being ἁγιος but on imitating God. For Paul ἅγιος does not seem ever to have this moral sense; the latter appears to have come later, and may very possibly have been due to the Jewish strain in early Christianity and the use of ἅγιος to translate קדוש, which latter had come to have a moral content.

[2] When Paul spoke of Christ dwelling in the believer he meant this to be taken literally. Christ entered into the man, freed him from the domination of his sinful flesh, and brought him from death to life. Thus the Christian actually participated by his faith in Christ's death, resurrection, and exaltation. Cf. Gal. 1: 16; 2: 20; 3: 27; 4: 19; Rom. 8: 10; 2 Cor. 4: 6, 7, etc.

[3] G. F. Moore, "Birth and Growth of Religion," p. 176.

reckoned as less than nothing. In comparison with this one great hope of being found in Christ, and through a life of participation in Christ's sufferings of attaining to the resurrection of his Lord, they were but refuse and offscouring.

This was the heritage in store for every Christian. The prize, beside which all else was worthless, was the call to this glorious fellowship that came from God through Christ Jesus. The way might be rough; the Christian life which must be resolutely achieved might be accompanied by suffering; temptations would come but never beyond their strength; false teachers would strive to deceive; the lusts of the flesh would menace; but all these must be crushed. The struggle would be hard, but the goal would be worth it. Nor must they wait too long. Even then the day was at hand. For those who failed it would be a day of wrath and condemnation; but to those who were in Christ, and whose lives proved it, it would be a day of praise and honor, and, better than that, of eternal life in their Lord. Thus the first demand upon the Christian was, as an individual, to make his life conform to that of his Lord; to cut himself free resolutely from all that would hinder and impede. Its character was purity, separateness; its motive the hope of eternal salvation.

To us today Paul's emphasis on morality and his insistence that actual union with Christ must result in a changed life seem perfectly normal. Yet it must never be overlooked that that would not have been the consensus of opinion in his own day. The Oriental mystery cults made no such demands on their devotees; correctness of ritual, not purity of life, was the essential requirement. Moreover, religion and ethics in the ancient world were not so nearly identified as we are wont to make them today.

This makes Paul's insistence on the changed life which bears fruits of the spirit the more noteworthy, for one might expect from passages like Romans 9: 30-32; 11: 6, where faith and works are set in contrast, that Paul would have entirely

disregarded conduct and might seem to clash with James. Here Paul and James are on entirely different ground. It is an error to feel that one has a broader view than the other, for they are not discussing the same matter. James is arguing that both faith and works are necessary; Paul, on the contrary, although setting fully as high an ethical standard, denies that salvation comes through works, but insists that the works evidence the fact that the individual has actually entered into the union with Christ.

The significant point for us is not to strive to defend Paul's logic—always a difficult undertaking—but to recognize how fundamental to all his thinking was the emphasis on moral probity. Well did he realize the danger of his emphasis on freedom from law. The *pneumatikoi* at Corinth were evidencing the results that might well come from such a teaching when detached from moral requirements. Accordingly, again and again he asserts that such conduct clearly revealed the fact that the faith professed is not in Christ but in the power of wickedness, and warns that all men regardless of baptism must stand before the judgment-bar. (Romans 14: 10; 2 Cor. 5: 10.)[4]

The question arises why Paul laid the stress he did on moral conduct. There is a tendency today to see a Stoic influence at work in the apostle. There is no question but what the Stoic moral requirements were strict in Paul's time, and that he would have approved them, but I see no reason for assuming influence where the evidence is completely lacking. Paul's heritage from Judaism and his view of Jesus are sufficient to explain his attitude.

In Judaism religion and morals were entirely identified, and the highest of standards for conduct set. God had revealed his will here as in everything else. Israel was to follow it. Here

[4] 1 Corinthians 3: 13 would seem to give some justification for the view that Paul felt that though all would be searched and proved, and that the one whose works failed the test would suffer a serious loss, yet he would be saved ultimately. On the one hand, faith must be a new life; fruits of the spirit must be shown. Baptism and being ἅγιος were not enough. On the other hand, the man brought into union with Christ even though he grievously fails has been baptized and will be saved. The two cannot be reconciled.

an important point is to be noticed. The fundamental requirement was conformity to God. "Be ye holy, for I am holy." Yahweh was a God of unstained character; no impure myths or legends told of his amours. He was a God of righteousness and of holiness; and holiness—at least in the days of Judaism—signified moral purity. Accordingly, the people must reflect this character in their lives.

Paul held this view of God. This moral outlook on life was bred in the bone. So when he came to his view of mystical union of the believer with Christ—which actually lay at the bottom of all his thinking—it is but natural that the same strict moral requirements would be made. Christ was no unmoral or immoral deity, as were the lords in some of the other cults. None of the amours or impure stories that were told of all the pagan deities were told of him. His character was of the same spotless purity as was that of Yahweh. The result was that requirements of character, which were neglected or unnoticed by the ministrants of the Oriental mystery cults, were of prime importance to Paul. Such was the Lord to whom Christians were most intimately united, who dwelt in them, and to whom they were set apart from all that would defile. Anything that would tend to sully Christ, to join him to a harlot, to defile the body which was his holy temple, was an abomination and to be shunned resolutely.

The historian is always subject to the danger of attempting to find the complete explanation of a man in his environment and heredity, and thus to neglect the personal element. In none is this more unfortunate than in Paul. He was a debtor both to Jew and Greek, but that does not explain him. His own personality and individual contribution can not be neglected. This is particularly true in his moral teachings. Here Paul was reflecting his own outlook on life. He could well admonish his churches to become imitators of him. His standards were of the highest. He has often been charged with being a casuist and opportunist, but the criticism neglects

the essential fact that Paul's opportunism was never to his own advantage. He might be all things to all people, but his purpose was to win them for God.

Here Philippians 1: 15-18 is instructive. Apparently some Christians who were jealous of Paul had been striving to undermine his influence at Philippi and had made false charges against him, yet Paul refuses to yield to any personal animosity, but rather rejoices in so far as they preach Christ—in spite of their attack on him. This is one of the brightest spots in Paul's writings. No bidding for flattery here. This reveals the sincerity and disinterested nature of the apostle's work. Even in Galatians 5: 12, which Sanday feels to be "one of the very few flaws in a truly noble and generous character," it is not personal animosity that leads the apostle to speak in bitterness. His opponents are poaching on his preserves, but the terrible thing to Paul is that owing to their selfishness and desire for personal gain they are striving to nullify Christ's death and to plunge the Galatian Christians back into hopeless servitude to the law of sin and death. Paul's words are bitter, but the bitterness does not come from personal grudge. Or again in the delightful little letter to Philemon, that seems genuine if any of the letters are to be attributed to Paul, he again shows his ethical soundness. Gladly would he have kept Onesimus to help him, yet he sent him back to make restitution.

In the course of a more detailed examination of Paul's particular precepts and admonitions we should have occasion to consider his motives and arguments in fuller detail, but it has seemed wise in this discussion of his emphasis on morality and high standards of life in an age when many teachers were completely silent on the subject, to stress the fact that while his Jewish heritage explains why a high morality *might have been natural* to him, as a matter of fact it *was,* and that it seemed to him, far from constituting any artificial or unreasonable service—what gentleman does?—to be the normal result of a life lived in Christ.

But Paul was a practical man, and he realized well that this was a practical world. Though the Christian was united with his Lord, he was also in the closest contact with his fellows. They had had similar experiences; they were joined in the same vital union—or should be—with their risen Lord; their tasks were much the same. Accordingly, they should live in the most perfect harmony, and by a mutual give-and-take strengthen each other in their glorious faith. Paul loves to emphasize the " solidarity " of man, the joint interest which binding humanity together makes the brother's interest truly one's own.

Here Paul made his most lasting contribution. The Stoics had urged a noble life, a resolute uprooting of all passions and appetites, a purging of the life from all excesses and lusts of the flesh, a daily self-examination and gradual improvement. But they failed to provide a goal attractive to the many. Comparatively few cared to accept the rigorous self-discipline with no goal save doing it because it was right; weariness in well-doing was the great obstacle. There was no future reward held out to them, nor was there the challenging social call—to do it for the sake of one's fellow citizen.

Paul met both these longings. Like the mystery cults Christianity promised future life where all transient sufferings and sorrows would be forgotten in the glorious estate reserved for them. And Christianity was free from the extravagances and obscenities that so often marred the other mysteries and had to be explained or allegorized away. But in addition to this goal or reward which served as a tremendous motive Paul gave Christianity a lasting solidarity by his emphasis on the social unity. Not only was a man to strive to walk worthily of the inheritance that was to be his, and by his purity of life to show he was a " new man," but he was to live and act in such a way that his brethren might also attain. They were a little band of people, sojourners in a foreign land; heaven was their home. They were exposed to dangers both from Jew and heathen,

False brethren were striving to spy out their freedom, to bring them again into captivity to sin. They must offer an unbroken front to the enemy.

Nor was this the only reason for their union. Aside from the danger from without that united them, the Christians were to live together as brethren; their faith was in a common Lord —one Lord, one faith, one baptism. Dissension and discord among themselves was a sin against Christ; for by the particular nature of their bond with him they were linked together. As Christ dwelt in them, they together actually formed his body, various members surely, but yet together actually making up the body. Lack of harmony, factiousness, and the like, would disrupt Christ's body; so the sin of the one was against the many. Actually this consciousness of the corporate life, of the unity of believers, was the most effective motive that Paul could have urged for achieving the true κοινωνία.

Love and forbearance were the great social virtues. Love that united all in the common bond; that saw in his neighbor's good his own; this was the social virtue par-excellence. It stood the fulfilment of all law. But complementing it was forbearance. If the Christian groups were to be in harmony and in peace—and God had called them to peace—they must show forbearance each to the other. As each had received special gifts from God he was to use them, but was to remember that the really great gifts were those that ministered to the edification of all. All had not reached the same stage of moral maturity. Those who were strong must never misuse their freedom; they were to bear the burdens of the weak, lest the weaker brother perish—a brother for whose sake Christ had died. In Romans 14 on the contrary, it is to be observed that the weaker brother is not to relapse into self-complacency on account of his scruples and assume a self-righteous judgment toward those who have more common sense. "Let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth; for God hath received him." As love was the all-enduring virtue and forbearance was its

corollary, service was the great duty. Each man was to help the other; service was the law of life. They had been called to freedom—but not to a freedom that was license, but where love found its expression in service.

In such a group arrogance and pride would be out of place; they were not their own, but were bought with a price. Each was to walk preferring his neighbor to himself and in obedience to those in spiritual authority over them. Thus the purity and uprightness, the strictness and temperance of life that was demanded of the individual Christian as such from his relation to Christ, flowered out into the social virtues and duties due to the fact that they were all members one of another making up the body of which Christ was the head.

But though the Christians were thus united through their Lord one to another, they were living in a hostile world. Accordingly, questions arose as to what was to be the relation of the individual Christian and of the Christian fellowship with this world. Paul's teaching was explicit. To the government and those in authority over them they were to be in the most lawful obedience, for the powers that be were ordained of God—a divine institution. To the members of the world discreet; all fellowship with them was not forbidden, indeed could not be. Christians lived in the world though they were not of the world. They were to be ever conscious, however, of the differences between themselves and those about. If the Christian was the slave of a heathen master, he was to serve him in the most perfect fidelity. If a Christian was married to an "unbeliever," the Christian was not to seek to break the alliance unless the unbeliever so desired. But he was not to make new alliances of this sort. So far as possible he was to remain unfettered. The attitude seems to be expressed by the warning: Be discreet, avoiding everything that would subject the Christian fellowship to attack or defame. Various questions presented themselves and received special attention, yet this seems to have been the principle underlying the apostle's advice.

Thus we see Paul had no formal system of ethics as such; no text-book for Christian conduct, though the *Haustafeln* in the epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians would seem to be a step toward filling that need.[5] Ethics and religion for him as for any other Jew could never be dissociated. The Christian ethic was the living in a manner worthy of the high calling to which the Christian had been called. It embraced the whole of life and all the relationships of life. While occasional questions would arise as to the proper course with the fellow member and his social responsibilities, or with the outside ἄπιστοι, yet the real answer was implicit in the Christian's proper conduct of life as such. Accordingly, all these distinctions, which to a degree are necessary for a modern consideration, are not completely happy, and must never be regarded as hard and fast. All the duties and virtues, the responsibilities and privileges, were included in the task the Christian had of living in a way worthy of his calling, and were inspired by the longing to attain to his promised reward.

In conclusion, throughout his epistles the ethical note is prominent. The theological or doctrinal discussions may engage him for the moment, yet he ever turns back as Gardner[6] acutely observes, " with obvious relief . . . to his ethical exhortation." These exhortations for the most part were called forth to meet the specific needs of the Christians to whom he ministered, and thus were intensely practical and timely in their nature and a far step from the ordered sequence of a Greek moralist like Aristotle. Yet they were not the impromptu words of an opportunist, but were the expression of the deep-seated principles governing his life—of the fact and implicates of union with Christ, and their corollary the union of fellow believers in Christ. We might almost say this sense of κοινωνία produced his ethics, or at least gave to it its distinctive form.

[5] The Pastorals show the next step, while a passage like Clem. Alex. *Paed.* III, 11ff gives a real handbook of Christian conduct discussing the question of proper clothing, the propriety of wearing ear-rings, finger-rings; use of cosmetics; how to walk decorously; the question of amusements; even the description of the model maiden, what she should do and what not, etc.

[6] " Religious Experiences of St. Paul," p. 139.

SOME PRESENT-DAY ASPECTS OF THE CONVERSION EXPERIENCE

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CONVERSION as a definite and necessary religious experience has been an established doctrine in evangelical circles for centuries. This doctrine has been based somewhat on the traditional views of human nature, and also on such sayings as that in Matthew 18: 3, "Except ye be converted (turned) and become as little children ye shall not see the kingdom of God."

THE PROBLEM

But the study of the mind and of human nature has modified the views concerning this subject. Betts and Hawthorne [1] in their recent book made the following comments:

> It is beyond question true that a full, rich, vital religious consciousness can be developed by a process of normal growth without the necessity of conversion or any emotional upheaval. . . None may doubt that the grace of God is able to save a soul through conversion; and none may doubt either that it is able to save that soul from the need of conversion.

"The conversion of parents," says Coe,[2] "tends to produce in their children a natural growth through nurture, and therefore to prevent conversion."

Thus we have before us a present-day problem in religion. It is one that merits serious consideration and gives rise to many questions of deep interest to the student of religion. Is conversion coming to be unnecessary? Does it need to be redefined? What are its function and value? How has the study of psychology affected our views of conversion?

[1] "Method in Teaching Religion," p. 33.
[2] "The Psychology of Religion," p. 155.

Definition

Starbuck, whose investigations of a quarter of a century ago really pioneered the psychological approach, describes it as follows: [3]

> Conversion is *suddenly* forsaking the lower for the higher self. It is the inhibition of lower channels of nervous discharge through the establishment of higher connections and the identification of the ego with the new activity.

Coe's definition closely resembles that of Starbuck: [4]

> When this religious self-realization is intense, and is attained *with some abruptness,* the change is called conversion. The convert looks upon himself as having passed from a lower to a higher level, as having attained to real life, or as having come to himself, or as having "found" God.

The classic definition of conversion is probably that of James: [5]

> To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self, hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior, and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior, and happy in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.[6]

Conversion is thus remedial. But these definitions do not solve the problem. Unless the higher self is attained "suddenly," or somewhat "abruptly," or unless the hitherto divided self becomes unified, the conversion experience is no longer needed. Is religious training, then, making unnecessary "the cure of souls"? If by a process of normal growth there can be a full, rich "life of conscious and purposed harmony with

[3] E. D. Starbuck, "The Psychology of Religion," p. 156. Italics not in the original.

[4] G. A. Coe, "The Psychology of Religion," p. 152. Italics not in the original.

[5] James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 189.

[6] Adopted as "sufficient for all practical purposes," by Underwood, "Conversion: Christian and Non-Christian." pp. 14, 15.

God," [7] there is but the maturing of a soul. Only one life, however, seemed to stand before the world with such a spotless, unblemished character that it could be said of him that he simply matured—that his religious consciousness was never violated to the point demanding repentance.

Another defintion of conversion is here suggested as a possible reconciliation between the traditional and newer views. CONVERSION IS THE MAKING OF NEEDED ADJUSTMENTS TO ONE'S RELIGIOUS IDEALS, TO GOD AS CONCEIVED OR EXPERIENCED, AND TO THE HIGHEST SPIRITUAL LAWS OF ONE'S NATURE IN THE PROCESS OF SELF-REALIZATION.

Nature

The last quarter of a century has seen a rather ambitious investigation of the phenomena of the spiritual life, especially as it bears on conversion. Religious experiences have been collected and classified. The experimental attitude has shown that God is a God of order; that law reigns as much in the spirit of man as in nature about; that known psychological facts apply as vitally to religious experiences as to the other activities of the soul.

The possibility of sudden conversion has been well established by psychology.

> Were we writing [says James] the story of the mind from a purely natural-history point of view, with no religious interest whatever, we should still have to write down man's liability to sudden and complete conversion as one of his most curious peculiarities.[8]

Begbie's account of "The Puncher" is typical.[9] But even in such cases

> conversion is the firing of a slowly-laid train, the bursting of a silently-maturing bud, the transformation scene in the life-long drama of the soul.[10]

[7] Betts and Hawthorne, "Method in Teaching Religion," p. 33.
[8] "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 230. [9] "Twice Born Men," Chapter 2.
[10] James Strachan, Art. Conversion, E. R. E., Vol. iii, p. 109.

There is a class of Christians who do not know how or when they began to believe. A study of ministers and seminary students showed some sixty per cent. to have begun the Christian life without a definite spiritual birthday.[11] Such persons are reared in a knowledge of God and what is best for them, with the expectation that a life of righteousness will follow, and that one's powers will be exercised in the advancement of the kingdom of God. As an acorn has in it the possibilities which need more than its own life to bring to fruition, so a child needs an environing God. To this environing God he responds. If God's will is carried out without rude breaks, a broken life, ugly memories, his spiritual life has beauty and more or less continuity. The Christian home should influence the child to grow up a Christian.

But does nurture eliminate conversion unless nurture has done its perfect work?

That changes both small and great may occur in the unconscious regions of the mind seems to be a clear teaching of psychology.

> Consciousness is a very poor witness to what takes place in the abysses of soul life. The remembered experiences of individuals are pitifully fragmentary and puerile, and often absurdly mistaken as to cause, process, issue, and object.[12]

Much of imitation, habits, etc., finds expression in the unconscious areas of the mind. Why may not many adjustments be made in this way?

Then, also, imperfect training, undesirable responses, inadequate motives, or the lack of available religious power may rob nurture of its perfect work. "What the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh,"[13] shows the imperfection of legalism. The law was holy, just, and good, but it needed to be supplemented. So nurture will need to be sup-

[11] Betts and Hawthorne, "Method in Teaching Religion," pp. 31, 32.
[12] G. Stanley Hall, "Adolescence," Vol. 2, p. 341.
[13] Romans 8: 3.

plemented by conversion whenever disobedience becomes a part of consciousness.

No one type of experience can be made the test of conversion. Each individual has its own ancestry, history, and peculiarities. The exercise of grace should vary with the needs of human nature. Yet how easy it is to apply stereotyped tests to conversion. Have they had some great emotional experience? Have extraordinary psychological events taken place in their consciousness? What would a board of deacons who expected such experiences have done with Doctor Cuyler, who states in his autobiography that he cannot fix the time or place of his conversion, and that he was gradually led into a religious experience by the influence of his mother? Or how would such a church have advised Phillips Brooks, who when thinking of the ministry, told his pastor, Doctor Vinton, that he did not know what conversion meant? The question seems to come back to the test of conversion—is it a striking psychological and emotional upheaval, or a facing toward God, working with him, and obediently following him? If the latter be more important, then it makes no difference how strong or weak are our inherited tendencies for good or evil, how deep the shadows, or intense the struggle. The main test is to find the life properly adjusted to its religious ideals, to God as conceived, and by obeying the highest laws of its nature to be progressively realizing itself.

Factors

1. *Sense of Imperfection or Incompleteness.* A great many states of mind converge here—doubts, sense of estrangement from God, depression, sadness, a feeling of helplessness, anxiety, humility, seriousness, etc.

2. *The Desire for the Good or Ideal Self.* This must inevitably be present if the first factor is to be real. Perfect satisfaction with the self will never bring about such a change. How do these ideals become a part of consciousness? Pri-

marily by religious training in the home and church, by worship, stories, books, friends, and other expressions of the Holy Spirit. Attributes of God, the character of Christ, challenging ideals are thus presented to the mind. A sense of imperfection, incompleteness, dissatisfaction is, then, a natural accompaniment.

3. *Emotional States.*

> All we know is that there are dead feelings, dead ideas, and cold beliefs, and there are hot and live ones; and when one grows hot and alive within us, everything has to recrystallize about it.[14]

It does seem that just now we should not look too lightly upon the emotional side of conversion when motives are recognized as being so useful in redirecting the life. Love, jealousy, guilt, fear, remorse, anger, hope, happiness, security, resolve bring about changes in the one experiencing them.

4. *Unconscious.* Since 1886 there has been a greatly extended view of the mind—that the field of consciousness is much broader than had been thought. Buried somewhere in the mind are memories, thoughts, feelings, which bulk much larger than primary consciousness. Here are the accumulated impressions of the years. Complexes are there formed with tendencies to action. These complexes may suddenly rise to consciousness and dominate it.

> To say that a man is converted means that religious ideas previously peripheral in his consciousness now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual center of his energy.[15]

Such a factor is a great encouragement to religious training. If little or nothing is ever forgotten—if all religious worship, reading, instruction is impressed upon the mind according to the degree of attention given to it—there is a complex being formed that will oppose evil, and that will never allow the mind to be really at peace until those ideals are being realized.

[14] James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 197.
[15] Op. cit., p. 196.

5. *Self-surrender.* This surrender may be either to the ideal elements in the unconscious or to objective spiritual realities—to Christ, as evangelical Christianity would say. Starbuck and James stress surrender to the subconscious processes. Of course the crisis does seem to be precipitated by the rising of ideals to consciousness. These must be very firmly intrenched in the unconscious areas of the mind. To surrender to these ideals is to let them dominate all areas of the mind—conscious and unconscious. But these concepts of God will likely be concepts of an objective being—a loving heavenly Father, a Creator, a Jesus who is a friend, helper, and Saviour. To be adjusted properly to these religious concepts and ideals it would seem necessary to surrender to them, and by so doing to have the whole personality in right relations with God.

6. *Volition and Effort.* With the "process of struggling away from sin" is involved the building up of a new set of moral and spiritual habits. At a time of crisis the movement should be more rapid. Unconscious processes should now come to consciousness and redirect the life.

7. *Religion.* Religion is dealing with deep questions and abiding values. It promises unfailing and powerful assistance. To hear others tell of what God has done for them, to feel that one is not alone in the struggle for the better life—that friends and God are also united in the struggle—gives joy, decision, and stability. "The expulsive power of a new affection" is now at work. At the same time God is able to do for the rightly adjusted life what he can at best but imperfectly do otherwise. This seems to be the point of Romans 8:28: "To them that love God [that are properly adjusted] all things work together for good."

Isaiah's experience [16] is a capital illustration of the value of conversion.

There is a concept of God's holiness which is fraught with religious ideals for himself and his nation. A long period

[16] Isaiah 6.

of preparation has led up to the climax. He is in the temple, thus representing very beautifully the value of training in the formation of worthy concepts of God.

Isaiah's concept of God filled him with a consciousness of need or incompletion. Newer scales of values are adopted. He feels that his own life is unworthy, and that he dwells in the midst of an unworthy people.

His life is properly adjusted to these new religious ideals and realities. The coal from off the altar is a figurative way of saying that he is placed in right relations with God and in accord with ideals which God has for himself and his nation.

His experience carries with it social obligations. A new self emerges which is obedient to the higher laws of his nature. "Here am I, send me!" By these words the prophet resolves to help change his people by his life. And in this process he achieves his true greatness.

In Raphael's picture "The Transfiguration" a strange scene is discovered. An epileptic boy and his attendants are beseeching Jesus' disciples to cure him. They are helpless. Two of the disciples are seen pointing toward the figure of Jesus on the mount.

We, too, find ourselves in the midst of great opportunities for soul cures. Appeals are constantly made to us. Wounded, disappointed, unhappy, struggling, aspiring souls are seeking for counsel and new life. Ours is the privilege of pointing them to great spiritual realities, especially to Jesus, whose mission is to find man in his sin or incompleteness and help him achieve his highest self. In addition we may skilfully, tactfully, and effectively help them adjust their lives to their ideals and these great spiritual realities.

DO WE ANY LONGER NEED THE SUPERNATURAL?

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THE rapid advance of science in exploring the physical universe has caused the realm of the supernatural to seem to many to have dwindled quite to the point of disappearance. Primitive man moved reverently, or restlessly, in a world regnant with supernatural events and persons. Today, some are walking in the same universe, seemingly confident that nature is all. Whatever of mystery that still remains will some day be resolved in light, and will be found to be quite as natural as that with which we are now on familiar, speaking terms.

So says the man who thinks science has pushed mystery back, and ever back; till only here and there a few breathing spaces are left in which religion may at least temporarily survive. When further research has filled in these lacunæ, religion and the supernatural will languish and die. This attitude is not uncommon in some scientific circles. A rising generation of educated young people are thinking in terms of a universe of law. Six days in the week they live in a world of uniformity and order. On the seventh, they are ushered through the church door, as one has put it, into "a land of topsyturvy, where axes float, dry sticks change to serpents, angels stir the waters of wells, cities are let down out of the sky; where we say prayers for rain an hour after we have consulted a government bulletin to see whether we shall need an umbrella before we get home."

Is it a matter of no consequence that the supernatural is playing a decreasingly prominent rôle in the thought and practical experience of many? Is it of no vital religious moment that the miraculous is seemingly a hindrance, rather than an aid to the faith of multitudes? A young man of manifest sin-

cerity, whose zeal for Christlike service made him a power for good among his fellows in college, sought ordination. He spoke with impressive earnestness and with every evidence of utter devotion to the cause of Christ and his Kingdom. When asked, however, about even the miracles of major importance in the Gospel records, he was unwilling either to affirm or deny his belief in them, stating that his faith in Jesus Christ rested on moral grounds and on his spiritual experience of saving grace in him. Some of his brethren were puzzled, some were grieved, and some were positive he should not be ordained. He had evidently reached his faith in Christ along a different route from that some, if not most, of his older brethren had traveled; and so some doubted he had arrived at all.

This is probably not an isolated case. What is its religious significance? While the terms "miraculous" and "supernatural" are not identical terms, the former is practically involved in any discussion of the latter. It is not a problem of the young people only. The rapid passing from one world-view to another; the vast amount of new knowledge of nature's ways of acting, and the bewildering array of new facts dug out by many investigators in ever-expanding fields of research, have confused many minds, disturbed their complacency, and even thrown consternation into some of their cherished beliefs. What was thought fixed, suddenly becomes unsettled. In the eighteenth century, Pope wrote:

> Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night;
> God said, "Let Newton be," and all was light.

But today,

> We once thought lines were straight and Euclid true;
> God said, "Let Einstein be," and all's askew.

It is as though one thought he had fairly well worked out the picture in the jig-saw puzzle, when some disturbing scientists come along, and one after another dump into his lap numberless new, odd blocks of knowledge, of confusing shapes and

sizes, and say, "You must fit these also into the picture." Professor Robert A. Millikan, winner of the Nobel Prize in physics, said in an address at Yale University, last October, that seven new discoveries in physics had upset all previous scientific thinking upon such important matters as the constitution and conservation of matter, the validity of the Newtonian laws, etc. Roentgen, Curie, Einstein, radio-activity, the electron, have set the minds of the scientists to whirling—they don't know what to think!

An Age-long Contest

It need not be a matter of surprise that the religious man has been disturbed, when once settled views seem shaken. It has always been so. Aristophanes is said to have attacked bitterly the materialism and impiety of Socrates for declaring that the overhanging clouds were not divine persons, but material, watery emanations. Only last December in Philadelphia, Professor M. Pupin, of Columbia University, told of his (rather happy) shock, when, a boy of eleven in his native Serbia, his teacher told him of Franklin's experiments with kite and key, disclosing the fact that lightning is electricity passing from cloud to cloud, or from cloud to earth, and not as he had been taught, God's expression of anger against wicked ways. Contemporaries of Galileo affirmed that his discoveries contradicted Mosaic revelation. Newton's law of gravitation was strenuously assailed by those who thought that it denied God's providential control of the universe.

Dean Inge sums up the tragedy of the situation, for many, in these words:

> Pieces of obsolete science, imprisoned, like a fly in amber, in the solid mass of religious creed, may become the casket in which the soul keeps its most valued treasures. They are defended fiercely, not because as brute facts they have much value for religion, but because they have become charged by association with spiritual values, which must be given through something.

It is for this reason that an antiquated scientific opinion seems worth fighting for; and a new one demands fighting against. It is feared that the baby will be thrown out with the once useful water of the bath.

The zeal to conserve all true spiritual values is most praiseworthy. On the other hand, the advocate of spiritual religion may well rejoice if he can rest his faith upon a foundation that is utterly independent of any scientific theory or physical discovery. A growing independence of miracle as support for faith has its wholesome side. Jesus continually discouraged the curious demand for signs and wonders as a condition of belief. Only if men could believe for no other reason, were they to "believe for the work's sake." To see God more surely in the extraordinary than in the ordinary is a common fault of men. Jesus more than once pointed out the moral weakness of this attitude. "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead."

It has frequently been asserted that the day of miracles is past, because we no longer need them; their aid is withdrawn because more convincing proofs of the divineness of Christ and his gospel are before us! Browning puts this view with striking force and beauty into the mouth of the aged apostle John:

> That help he needed once, and needs no more,
> . . . . . is withdrawn;
> For he hath new needs, and new helps to these.
> . . . . . .
> You stick a garden-plot with ordered twigs
> To show inside lie germs of herbs unborn,
> And check the careless step would spoil their birth;
> But when herbs wave, the guardian twigs may go.
> It is no longer for old twigs ye look,
> But to the herb's self . . . for what fruit's signs are.
> . . . . . This book's fruit is plain,
> Nor miracles need prove it any more.

If it be true that men do not need the enactment of miracles today to furnish basis for their faith, should it seem strange if

many declare that they find no need for the miracles of two thousand years ago as a support of their faith? The vital thing is that one have his faith well founded upon moral and spiritual realities, as our Lord preferred they should be, rather than on signs and wonders.

It was an evil and faithless generation that demanded signs; and Jesus sighed in his spirit at the people's insistence upon them as a condition of faith. (Matt. 12: 39; 16: 4; Mark 8: 12; Luke 11: 29.) When Philip asked a supernatural demonstration of the Father, Jesus threw the disciple back upon his personal experience with Himself. (John 14: 8ff.)

There would doubtless be no difficulty in accepting this position as to the relative value of miracle, were it not for theories concerning the Bible. The Bible is full of miracle. This raises a question not now immediately before us, however. We here are calling attention to the fact that the shifting of emphasis from miracle as a proof of divineness and as a basis for faith, has its good side. Miracle concentrates attention on God as *power,* operating in the physical world. The gospel of grace emphasizes his moral character as holy love, operating in the realm of spirit. The demonstration of physical power is not the best proof of spiritual character. The minimizing of the importance of miracle is a menace to faith only when one denies that God operates anywhere; when it grows out of pure rationalism rather than from an enriched spiritual discernment.

This leads us nearer to the crux of the question. It is sometimes said that the battle today between faith and its foes is the battle between naturalism and supernaturalism.

Since men use terms in different senses, it is well to ask what we mean by the supernatural. Undeveloped men call that supernatural which is simply the natural, by them as yet unexplored, or unexplained. Is the supernatural that which can *never* be explained by finite intelligence? Is it the superphysical? Is it the superpersonal? Or the superhuman? Is

it but the upper ranges of the natural? Is it entirely outside the natural, or the result of some force within, using the natural to accomplish its, or his, ends?

Nothing Supernatural to God

Finite intelligence must doubtless have some word to express the concept of the operation of a Super-intelligence and power acting in the realm of the finite. Hence, the word supernatural. But to God nothing is supernatural. All is natural. His every act is in accord with his nature, and in conformity with the nature of things. Nature is never violated. It is only to the limited mind of man that any act of his seems supernatural. The supernatural, then, is that manifestation of superpersonality acting in the natural order, superhumanly (that is, beyond the power and understanding of men) for the achievement of spiritual ends.

To act super-physically belongs to all personality, even finite personality, as when a human being manipulates physical laws to achieve his personal ends. The Super-person, God, may act super-humanly in the physical world to achieve his higher ends. This may rightly be called supernaturalism. Such acts, however, may be quite as natural, that is, in perfect accord with the true nature of things, as what is ordinarily recognized as natural, though they may appear to our lesser intelligences as miraculous.

There are, then, two very distinct types of naturalism—that which is personalistic and that which is purely mechanistic. To the former, the supernatural is simply the highest manifestation of the natural; to the latter, the supernatural simply does not exist.

It may be admitted that science can know only mechanism. It notes sequences, effects, and their immediate causes. It has no instruments or technique for doing more. The scientist errs only when he affirms there is no more. Professor Hocking has well said:

It is the realist in us who is credulous—for he is "taken in" by the face values of experience. It is the religious consciousness which is incredulous, refusing to believe that nature, as we find it, is or contains the whole of truth and destiny.

Science discovers only the mechanism of nature and describes its operation. It has nothing to say of how the machine got started, or why; what it is that keeps it going, or why it runs with such precision. And in fact, as J. Arthur Thomson says:

A self-stoking, self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-producing machine, is only by abuse of language called a machine at all. Mind produces and uses machines.

The more perfectly adjusted and efficient any machine is, the more does reason demand that a purposeful mind be posited to account for it. Science may disclose the rules of the great game of nature; but "the rules of the game do not play the game."

It has been said that a machine is only an extension of man's manual equipment and that its behavior is but "a specifically conditioned extension of human behavior." So this wonderfully complex and delicately adjusted "mechanism" we call nature is simply a specifically conditioned extension of the intelligence and will of the Super-person, God.

Mechanism, of itself, is particularly impotent to explain phenomena of mind. There is a school of psychologists that would reduce all human behavior to animal inheritances, reflexes, and instincts, in response to environment; or, to pathological complexes—ignoring most of those facts and factors that distinguish men from animals. Psychology becomes but a branch of biology, or of physiology, and religion a fear neurosis. Professor Cattell is quoted as saying, "It is well known that psychology lost its soul long ago, and is now fast losing its mind."

Instead of keeping our hearts with all diligence, since out

of them are the issues of life, we are warned to keep our glands in good condition for out of them are the issues of behavior. In case of bad behavior, however, the case is not hopeless; for one of our primal elder brothers may surrender a gland or two on our behalf, and thus bring to us all the vicarious atonement we need. Some one has renamed Dorsey's " Why We Behave Like Human Beings," " Why Human Beings Behave Like Beasts." Of course the animal in man behaves like an animal, unless it be modified, directed, ennobled by man's will, moving toward the higher ends of life.

The extremes will pass away. Materialistic science will be seen to be but fumbling at the fringe of things. Mechanism, indeed, is inconsistent with a changing, growing world. We can therefore let the evolutionist deal with the mechanist—even though nothing were hoped from the philosopher, the theologian, or from the profounder student of science itself.

Perhaps we are now better prepared to answer the query, " Do we any longer need the supernatural? "

Personality Necessary

The essential thing for vital religious faith is belief in a super-personal Being—a more fundamental matter than belief in the supernatural. Without that, the supernatural is meaningless and empty; with it, there is little difference whether we use the term supernatural or not.

It is characteristic of personality, even of a finite personality, to transcend physical nature, even though he be a part of it. That is, he uses it, modifies it, shapes it to his ends—not by violating it, but by conforming to it, commanding higher laws to modify the natural resultant of the lower. Bishop Gore, in his recent treatise, " Can We then Believe? " finds a rational credibility for the miraculous in the possibility and the reality of free will in man. For we are compelled to read back into God the same quality of freedom we find in man. It is characteristic of rational activity that it be able to behave

in an extraordinary manner under extraordinary conditions. "There, I take it, lies the whole philosophy of the miraculous."

The advocates of naturalism insist that man must not be considered apart from the natural universe. Very well, then, his moral and spiritual appreciations must be regarded as a part of the scheme as a whole. Since the processes of nature yield to rational inquiry, man's mind must be akin to universal mind. And since Nature attains its highest reach in man's capacity for moral and spiritual discernments, may we not fairly conclude that it is these that disclose the goal of the entire process? The religious man, therefore, is not primarily concerned in saving the supernatural, but in conserving the fact of *Personality* as the ultimate reality behind, and in all. The Christian is not primarily concerned with the question of Jesus' power to work a physical miracle, but rather with the more vital question, Can he by the divine nature and moral achievement of his personality bring men into fellowship with God? That such as he proved to be in spiritual discernment and power, should work miracles is not strange, but it is only secondary. The sort of supernaturalism we must still have is benign superpersonalism. Without this, religion is devoid of dynamic, is hopelessly bankrupt.

For the Christian then the crux of the matter lies in the question, Have we in the Personality of Jesus such a manifestation of moral power as no other human person has ever possessed? Has he unique power to redeem human lives from sin? If along with this spiritual power he had extraordinary authority over physical nature also, well and good. The first alone is vital to him as a spiritual Redeemer. The second adds to his Godlikeness, since the Creator is supreme and mighty in both realms. Yet let us never forget that Jesus came to show men the Father, and not the Creator-God. It is to weak, uninstructed faith that Jesus says, "That ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to *forgive sin,* he saith to the sick of the palsy, Take up thy bed and walk." Physical power

may hang well with spiritual power; the former does not necessarily *prove* the latter, however. Jesus apparently knew this; and so frequently discounted the first in the interest of the second. This is hardly conceivable, if he regarded them as equally vital, or the one the *sine qua non* of the other. Remember that the miracles of Jesus were more the manifestations of God's heart of compassion for the needy than a demonstration of God's strong arm of power.

The Need of Mystery

Religion is man's greatest adventure in mystery. Whatever one may say of miracle; or whatever position one may take as to the concept and term *supernatural,* mystery is essential to religion. Man builds his life on mystery and draws all his inspiration from it. When mystery is gone, faith is gone, religion is gone, man flounders in the mud.

If science has solved many mysteries, will it not finally dissolve all mystery? one fairly asks. To this we may reply with Prof. J. Arthur Thomson, " Each new discovery shows us a wider circle of our ignorance." How long will it take science to banish mystery at that rate? Besides, to discover a fact is not to explain it; to discover a law is not equivalent to solving a mystery. Electricity still holds its supreme secret as securely as when Galvani experimented with frog legs and Franklin with the kite. What is a " law of nature " anyhow, but the way nature seems to us uniformly to act? It is what we see, through a very tiny peep-hole.

Wonder still calls to us, as to the child Samuel through the darkness of the temple. But light and not darkness is the mystery. Said the prophet, " Thou art a God that hidest thyself " (Isa. 45: 15). But he is hid in light. (Ps. 104: 2.) Science has banished the gods because they have been found out. It cannot banish God, who becomes the more wonderful in his self-revealing light.

Religion is the response of the soul to the Infinite Mystery.

The demand that everything in religion be explained is not reasonable seeing that science itself raises more questions than it answers, and itself does, and must, hold many things on faith. As Professor Prichett of the Carnegie Institute confesses,

> Science is grounded in faith, just as is religion—and scientific truth, like religious truth, consists of hypotheses never wholly verified.

Categories and formularies, neither of science nor of theology, are capable of expressing all the facts of religious experience. Love cannot be set forth in terms of logarithms.

Seeing Nature Religiously

Furthermore, we need, if we would still be religious, a profound sense of the divineness of the natural order. The primitive peoples saw spirit everywhere. They were nearer right than are those who see God nowhere. Increase of knowledge of nature's mysteries tended to drive God from the ordinary to the extraordinary, from a natural into a supernatural realm. We need to recover the lost note. The natural order is God at work; not after the bizarre superstition of primitive man, but in regular and purposeful habit. Through law he keeps faith with the universe and achieves his ends.

It has been the weakness of the religious thinking of many that they have recognized God only in the special, the inexplicable, the spectacular. Should some extraordinary event or mysterious fact find scientific explanation, the faith of these is shaken or destroyed. So too, when one can see God only in the waste-places between the oases of verified knowledge, one's faith is precarious, for when the gaps are filled in, faith receives a serious blow.

It is unfortunate that when some hear it said that *all things* are divine they should conclude that *nothing* is divine in any important sense. The dualism which divides the world into the natural and the supernatural, the sacred and the profane, needs to give way to a deeper understanding of divineness every-

where. Science may threaten us with an ever-growing secularism, unless we perceive a yet profounder and "Higher Pantheism" than ancients or moderns, or the great laureate, ever yet expressed. Till then we are justified in still holding fast to that unresolved dualism of divine transcendence and divine immanence.

But surely, we may not refuse to believe that God does this or that in nature, simply because we have *discovered how* he did it. Furthermore, as Professor J. Y. Simpson says,

> For one who thinks of nature as the orderly expression of the working of a divine indwelling Spirit, which yet is not exhausted by the operation of natural forces, and is in that sense transcendent, to one for whom the cosmic order is no rival of God, but rather the continuous manifestation of his sustaining and controlling activity; to whom therefore all events are physical in the mode of their occurrence, but spiritual in their causation, it does not seem incredible that God should manifest himself in ways of which we have no previous or modern experience.

We can make a world of ever-expanding scientific knowledge safe for religion, if only we can see the divine miracle everywhere. The natural becomes supernatural, and the supernatural, natural.

Religion can lose nothing by being thought of as natural to man—a part of his very constitution and life as man; a biological fact, if you please. For religion is life in its highest expression. We have nothing to gain, and very much to lose in putting religion outside the realm of nature, in the supposed interest of the supernatural. Religion must stand in closest relation to all the rest of life.

To think of religion as a biological phenomenon is not to declare that it can be explained, or interpreted in terms of biophysics or of bio-chemistry. But rather that, when, in the onward and upward surge of life man appears, religion becomes a natural, an organic element in the life process; in fact, life's highest outreach, the best interpretation of life's meaning, and the best index of its goal.

JESUS' INTEREST IN HIS OWN HUMANITY

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THE term "Son of Man" is not a creation of the New Testament. In Ezekiel it is frequently found. One English author states it is found there nearly ninety times but never as alluding to Ezekiel himself; whereas in the New Testament it is found about eighty times, usually by Jesus Christ as relating to himself.

In the light of the New Testament word "man" it indicates descent. That is, human descent. It was the term used by Jesus relative to himself. It is his special term.

The passages which speak of Jesus as "The Son of man" speak of him as more than a Son of man. It is simply impossible to make all that is predicated of Jesus, as the "Son of man," dovetail into the realm of a natural man. The inevitable conclusion is that while Jesus was a natural man he was also superhuman, in the use of his powers, but not supernatural. Christ, as God manifested, was supernatural: Christ as man was human, and superhuman. Hughes in his "Manliness of Christ" undertakes to account for many things predicated of Jesus on mere natural grounds, but he fails to sweep away the evidence of the superhuman. Nevertheless, the principle in Mr. Hughes' work may be accepted, but not as he uses it. We read in the Scriptures the following:

Matt. 9:6: "Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins."
Matt. 12:8: "Son of man is Lord even of the Sabbath."
Matt. 13:41: "Son of man shall send forth his angels."
Matt. 24:30: "Then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven."
Matt. 25:31: "Son of man shall come in his glory, and all his holy angels with him."

Certain Bible passages predicate his superhumanity! His superhumanity no more excludes his divinity than his divinity

excludes his humanity. The pure humanity of Jesus is so clearly set forth as to be as distinctly observable, in the Scriptures, as his divinity, if not more so.

"The Son of man hath not where to lay his head"—"came eating and drinking"—"must suffer many things." Such passages, in which the phrase "Son of man" does not occur, abound in the New Testament. "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" These words were not the meaningless mutterings of an insane man. The man Jesus felt he was forsaken by God.

One of the plainest utterances of Jesus about himself is in John 8:40, "Ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth, which I heard of God." Surely there can be no doubt about the human element in the person of our Lord. The question now comes up, what is involved in these passages?

The fact involved is the perfect humanity of our Redeemer.

The phrase "Son of man" is used, and emphasized, in order to teach the realism of Christ's manship. It claims that he was not a myth, nor an anomaly, but an actual man, born of a woman under the law. He was conceived and nourished in a human womb, and delivered in birth, as a man. As a child he acted childishly; as a man he acted manly.

In five respects Jesus was completely human.

1. He was born from the womb of a woman.
2. He had a childhood and childhood's growth.

To deny this to our Lord would be extremely hazardous. Little is definitely said in the Bible of Jesus' childhood, yet there is sufficient to convince any who need convincing. When the child was about six weeks old he was taken to, and presented in, the Temple according to the requirements, and it was at this time Simeon and Anna prophesied about him (Luke 2: 39, 40):

> And when they had performed all things according to the law of the Lord they returned unto Galilee to their own city Nazareth. And the child grew and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom: and the grace of God was upon him.

About twelve years later the boy goes to the Holy City to visit the Temple, and this time under different circumstances. After the festival terminated he remained with the doctors, and is supposed to be lost. His mother, after a wearisome search, finds him among these learned men in Jerusalem, debating on profound matters, and persuades him to return with her. It is at this point the Bible speaks:

> And he went down with them and came to Nazareth and was subject unto them: but his mother kept all these sayings in her heart. And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man.

That is, he grew physically, mentally, and spiritually. He began, therefore, to grow according to laws controlling his being, and continued therein. This early development of Jesus must have been accomplished in the same manner in which all young people are developed. Jesus in childhood could not have been an indolent and dreamy being. It was generally acknowledged he never learned the theological science of his day, in the regular schools, and yet he showed a profound and accurate knowledge of language, ethics, customs, prophecy, and the art of criticism, which he certainly must have learned.

He grew. His store of knowledge, and state of mental enlargement, were not miraculous products. Physical energy and mental laboriousness explain these splendid acquisitions of Jesus the "Son of man." That he received revelations he affirms plainly enough, but he never so much as intimates that he received everything by inspiration divine.

Thus it seems clear, it was necessary for Jesus to learn obedience. (Heb. 5:8.) Jesus as the Son of man was not inherently authoritative, for we read in John 5:27, "And God hath given him authority." Even the knowledge of Jesus is said to have been limited according to Mark 13:31: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my word shall not pass away. But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels who are in heaven, neither the Son."

Since Jesus in some particulars was in comparative ignorance, and was capable of progressive development, the Scriptures do not intimate that Jesus, as the Son of man, was omniscient. Omniscience and growth cannot be predicated of the same nature, in God, or man. We may unhesitatingly affirm that revelations to Jesus must have begun when he was yet a boy; Luke implies that much. As a boy, Jesus was like other boys, but superior to them. He had no sin, therefore he was free from sin's legacy, such as a crippled mind, or diseased brain. While a boy, his ability to think, and grasp thought, must have been prodigious. Still the process of mental growth was the same, with less effort, as in all boys. It is not too much to affirm, it is possible, and probable, the child Jesus had the voice of God ever present in his soul, gradually enlarging him in knowledge, and understanding, as to the nature of his person and mission. This knowledge was, probably, not altogether, and fully, in his possession until far on in his ministerial career.

3. The third evidence of our Saviour's humanity is the weakness of his body.

Doctor Osgood (Sermon, Philadelphia Association of Ministers, 1894) made the statement:

> He grew through infancy and childhood to manhood: he suffered hunger and thirst: his body was nourished as other bodies are: he felt weakness and pain: he walked and slept. "Inasmuch then, as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself, likewise, took part of the same" (Heb. 2:14).

That statement of the eminent theologian and teacher is credible and correct.

4. The fourth evidence lies in the fact that he had anxiety of mind.

Jesus in Gethsemane cries out, "My soul is exceeding sorrowful even unto death."

5. The fifth evidence is seen in the Saviour's full sweep of human life.

It may not be valueless to quote, at this point, from the celebrated J. S. Mills[1]:

It remains a possibility that Jesus actually was what he supposed himself to be, a man charged with a special, express, and unique commission from God, to lead mankind to truth and virtue. About the life and sayings of Jesus there is a stamp of personal originality, combined with profundity of insight, which must place the prophet of Nazareth, even in the estimation of those who have no belief in his inspiration, in the very first rank of the men of sublime genius.

Now, placed besides this concession of the philosopher, who practically denies God, some of the words of Martensen[2] are in point:

Christ himself is the prime miracle of Christianity, since his coming is the absolutely new beginning of a spiritual creation, in the human race, a beginning whose significance is not wholly ethical, but cosmical. Christ is something new in the race. He is not a mere moral and religious genius, but the new man, the new Adam, whose appearance in the midst of our race has a profound bearing not only on the moral, but on the natural world.

This discussion does not deny the divinity of Christ. Under the limitations of the human mind how Christ was divine, I do not know. How Christ could be God, is not so clear as how he could be man. That is, to man's ordinary comprehending powers. We must admit it is easier to believe in our Saviour's humanity, than in his divinity. I think Christ's method of presenting the doctrine of his Person was, first, as the "Son of man," then, the Son of God. Luthardt, in his Bremen lectures, has well said:

We see in him the perfect original of humanity, as well as do the inhabitants of Greenland, or the black Negroes of Africa, or the sons of the warm lands of the Ganges. What is the mysterious power of this one, who binds the hearts of all men, of all times, and places, so firmly that they know no higher love than that which they bear to him?

[1] "Essay on Religion," pp. 254, 255.
[2] "Christian Dogmatics," p. 267.

The distinguished Unitarian Channing makes this statement:

> He comes with the consciousness of more than human greatness to accomplish an infinite work, and where do you find him? How does he converse, how live with men? Go to the house of Peter, the fisherman. Go to the well of Samaria, where he rests after the fatigues of his journey. Would you hear him teach? You may find him, indeed, sometimes in the Temple, but commonly you may find him instructing in the open air, now from a boat, now from a mount, now in the street of a crowded city. In these places and everywhere, he lived with men, as a man, a brother, a friend, sometimes a servant: and entered with a deep unexplained sympathy in the feelings, interests, wants, sorrows of ordinary men, and even of the most depressed, despised, and forsaken of the race.

Such are the facts involved in the self-announced humanity of our blessed and adorable Redeemer.

Now consider the significance of the facts involved in this phrase "Son of man."

Probably no historical fact has so much provoked the criticism of a learned age, as the "Person and Work of Jesus Christ."

Any character which can stand the united attacks of many forms of skepticism, and of satanic power, without becoming dimmed or marred, has a large claim on the respect of every intelligent man. To inquire into the significance of such a character is relevant to our present line of thought. The perfect humanity of Jesus involved in his use of the phrase "Son of man" is significant of three things:

1. *Ideal Manhood*

There has been a ceaseless and vast variety of opinions about what sort of man Jesus was. He used to be thought of as mythical, then ordinarily as historical. Concessions flowed into the historical channel, made by specialists of the German and French schools, admitting that Jesus was very virtuous, and very wise, and afterward was looked upon as a genius. While this was going on, Renan thought of him as an enthu-

siast " who progressed through gloomy fanaticism to imposture," while Strauss called him an arrogant, self-exalted man, who was on the road to insanity.

Our own day is not free from such sentiments. It is, therefore, a matter of supreme satisfaction for the church of God to see, in Christ, the ideal of manhood. It is to be rejoiced over that each succeeding age, of late, has attained to a more exalted and refined conception of what a man is, and what a man is for. The more we scan the countenance of our Lord Jesus, the more distinctly the benign characteristics of God's ideal come to view. The term " Son of man " as imbedded in the Holy Scriptures, is a magnificent exhibition of kindness on the part of God, because it helps us to grasp the person of our Lord Jesus. It is intended, I think, among other things, to show us how much like God a real man can be.

God aims to draw us away from our old and self-constructed ideal, to his more perfect and satisfactory pattern. Reflect on what you think a divine ideal should be, and you will find your choicest fabrication realized and wonderfully excelled in the man Jesus, who had not where to lay his head. Here, in this central historic being, you find a character ablaze with perennial sublimity.

God, in placing such a being before us, unquestionably wishes us to read his loving design to reconstruct man, and ultimately assimilate him with Jesus, so closely that it will be profoundly true that " we shall see him as he is and be like him."

Our Saviour evidently prized this term " Son of man " because he used it in his discourses down to the last. Mark records this use, as do the subsequent Gospels. Thus he declared that the Christ belonged to the whole family of man, and that all his functions and offices were for the race. The Father calls him his beloved Son. The disciples honor him as the Son of the living God. Himself, in the main, is content with the name " the Son of man."

2. Ideal Brotherhood

The manhood of Jesus is a majestic provision for our elevation. The incarnation was for man's benefit and not for God's. On this account it must be within the grasp of man. If Jesus was God's ideal of a true man, and the purpose of this ideal was for man, to learn what his God wants him to be, it follows that as many as are reconstructed, according to this model, have a likeness to each other. The same model is used in every case. The same expert workmanship exists in each and every person. By as much as the great character-reconstructor can repeatedly imitate a given pattern, by that much all acted upon must resemble the model, and the remodeled. This is brotherhood. If Christ is indeed our elder Brother, we expect him to set us an example as to how we should treat each other, and the world, which lies beyond the boundaries of our particular fraternity. It is not difficult to conclude, on the basis of the best obtainable evidence, that Jesus has, through all his known career on earth, given an example of brotherhood. But what I specially refer to now is the approachableness of Jesus. His human kinship with us shows that he, being one of us, in the flesh, can be approached freely. He is our Brother, beloved. Did he not say, "Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother"? As the ideal brother we may approach him with our cares and sorrows. "He was made perfect through suffering." "He was in all points tempted like as we are." "It pleased the Lord to bruise him." Christ knows what it is to have been forsaken by God. He knows by bitter experience how to enter into our situation.

Christ's life then was not a fated unnatural panorama. There is nothing whatever in his life on earth that even suggests the human soul and body of our Lord were mechanical, or passive, or plastic, like a vessel into which everything must be poured. What sort of a man would that theory present to us? It would rob him of all that makes him capable of appeal-

ing to our hearts and minds. His reality of person, his reality of life and suffering makes him what he is to us. If, as the Scriptures say (Heb. 4: 15) he was tempted in all points as we are, was he tempted, as we are, and was he tempted, in all points as we are, or is it a false statement, an extravagance of speech, possibly a deception? If he was, his human nature must have shrunk under the weight of responsibility. This is the only way we can account for the awful prayer in Gethsemane. John 4: 34 repeats the words of Christ when he said, " My meat is to do the will of him that sent me "; yet Matthew 26: 39 records Jesus face to the dust in agony. Now turn to Hebrews 5: 7-9 and read:

> Who in the days of his flesh when he had offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto him that was able to save him from death, and was heard in that he feared: though he were a Son, yet learned he obedience by things which he suffered: and being made perfect he became the author of eternal salvation unto all that obey him.

If this does not specially refer to Gethsemane, it certainly includes it. Does not Christ's surrender of his will to God's plainly intimate the position taken in this study? The longer one ponders on this last expression, the more certainly does it appear that Christ was capable of voluntary desires relative to which he did not know if it was the will of God to grant, and which therefore he would only ask, in perfect submission to that will.

" O, my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou." That prayer was wrung out of his soul in three successive struggles.

Such yielding declares it possible for Jesus to have demurred. He really did feel his own particular will express itself as contrary to what came to light as the will of God. This, mark, is recorded as a fact, in the life of one who knew no personal sin, and opens to us the wonderful idea that sin does not consist in having one's own conviction and desire, though it should prove to be, as in Christ's case, contrary to God's will.

It is best not to emphasize the view that Christ instantly surrendered. His biography does not so speak. It matters little what some authorities have to say when we read Mark 14: 36, "And he said, Take away this cup from me, nevertheless, not what I will, but what thou wilt." Then in Mark 14: 39, "Again he went away and prayed and spake the same words." And again in Matthew 26: 44, "And he left them and went away again, and prayed the third time, saying the same words." All this praying and moving about and returning required the element of time. No student will accuse Christ, when surrounded by the approaching horrors of the crucifixion, of using random words or meaningless mutterings. Christ's "will I" (θέλω) in Gethsemane, demands a careful and reverent notice. No amount of persuasion, or inclination against the legitimate results, can rob this expression of its proper meaning. You must remember this verb, stated or supplied, is used both in the case of God, as God, and Jesus as man. Strict definition and etymology require us to be loyal to the Lord's language, as well as to the Lord of language. True exegesis, historical and grammatical, demands a fair consideration of words. The spirit of truth can never be arrived at except by a conscientious, and if needs be, severely accurate use of the verbal vehicle. Christ's "I will" (θέλω) means nothing else than his personal will, and this will he confessedly says was for a time opposed to what came to light as God's will. You observe the Bible affirms Jesus was a tempted man, that he was capable of being tempted. I am persuaded that he was capable also of being ruined, as a man, because if he was not capable of yielding to temptation, he was not a man.

The moral quality of Christ's glorious life, viewed simply in the human light, cannot lie in his incapability to sin, but in his matchless freedom from a willingness to do wrong. While we accept the mystical union of two natures in the person of Christ, the God-man, it will not do to look at the man Jesus as though his human nature were God. True, as to person, he

was God manifest in the flesh, but his flesh was not God, nor was his human soul. The incarnation was not divinity swallowed up, and lost in humanity, and yet how he was God manifest in the flesh, and how he could be God and man, in one person, I don't know. Who does?

We can only examine the subject on the evidence furnished, and this leads to the position assumed. The conquest of the Son of man was achieved by Jesus as a man, with a man's weaknesses and limitations! The critical evidence of Christ's divinity would not suffer if Jesus' humanity were more frankly and forcefully presented. Christ's manhood brings him very near to us, and makes him plain to our understanding. The sublime realism of Christ's manhood needs to be warmly pressed against the throbbing heart of mutilated humanity.

It makes God intelligible. " I am that which has been, and which is, and which is to be, and my veil hath no mortal yet drawn aside," was the legend, describing God, sculptured upon the pediment of one of the most famous temples of ancient Egypt. It is full of that undying longing in human hearts to find out God. It is full, too, of that baffled feeling, which must always haunt human search.

Who art thou, then, O Lord? has been the question of the ages. Of thy glory the heavens speak. Thou fillest the spaces with thy presence. Thou makest the universe thy temple. From thee all things proceed: to thee all things return at last. But who art thou? And back from the immeasurable silence, there ever comes to man the tantalizing echo of his own question.

Who by searching can find out God? Can you measure the distances between the stars with a foot rule? Can you vanquish the night's darkness by the flash of a glowworm? Can what is finite stretch itself to the comprehension of the infinite? Who by searching can find out God? If God tarries hidden in the recesses of his own Infinity, I can never find him out, and my heart's hunger is smitten into deeper famine. But if God descends to my finite level; if he stoops within the range of my narrower capacity; if he stands before me in my human nature, a being intelligible to me, in a brother's form; if he looks upon me out of human eyes, and speaks to me in such language as my finiteness must use; then the veil which hides

him is drawn aside. Then the longing to know God, in me, is met and answered.

In Rome there is a wonderful fresco by Guido called The Aurora. It glows upon a lofty ceiling. Standing and looking upward at it, one's neck stiffens, the head grows dizzy, the figures get hazy and indistinct. The owner of the palace has placed a broad mirror near the floor. One may sit down before that and study the wondrous picture reflected in it. There is no longer stretch and strain and dizziness and indistinctness and inability. This divine yet human Christ is the mirror of Deity for us. He is the express image of the Godhead standing with us in our humanity. He interprets God to our longing hearts. In him God becomes intelligible. There is something vast and vague and difficult to grasp in the name and thought of God Almighty. But Jesus—God in our own nature—one like ourselves, as a child is, shows us what a natural, human child may be. He is incomparable. He stands before us as a brother, carrying the burdens of private and public life, and pointing the way to victory.

He lends his presence to our feasts and tells us they are rightful events. With tender touch of soul, in this altogether too sad world, he accompanies us to the tomb, letting us know that our griefs are within his knowledge and sympathetic experience.

The Elder Brother enters death with us, and flings the light of his resurrection through the dark way.

Our Brother, always fellowshiping with us in loving and suffering, is not distant from us. No possible chasm separates us. He is close to us, braided into our passions, and human relations. He still shares his human nature with us. He is still the "Son of man," Jesus Christ. Thus comprehended he is no longer vague and difficult to grasp. He gives reality to our thoughts of God.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL AND CRITICAL NOTES

The American Geographical Society announces the coming issue of a six-volume series of studies of explorations in Arabia and Mesopotamia. No region has proved more alluring for the explorer, none probably has yielded more interesting results than the region of the rivers Ephrates and Tigris.

From the dawn of history northern Arabia and the interior of Mesopotamia have been wild borderlands of civilization. Age-old contacts with civilized neighbors have made these regions exceptionally interesting to the student of history and geography. Here many a ruined city awaits the archæologist's spade and tape; many a Bedouin custom and tradition, the product of ceaseless conflict and adjustment between man and his desert environment, is as yet unrecorded. Here the naturalist will find blooming in hidden ravines many a new plant. The glamor of the unknown still lingers over these wastes; broad tracts remain unseen by Western eyes, and constant danger menaces the explorer.

This particular series of studies is based upon the work of Professor Alois Musil of Prague University.

This work will probably be more valuable for its historical, geographical, and ethnographical contributions to exploration than to the distinctly archæological field of research. Since the World War, the region of the Hejaz and of those unique people who played so interesting a rôle under the leadership of that remarkable young Britisher, Colonel Lawrence,[1] in the struggle to break the power of the Turk in the East, have come to be of fresh interest. The first of the six volumes will treat of the Northern Hejaz, the probable route of the Exodus, the location of the Midianite tribes, and the Job country. Bedouin customs, manners, and folk-lore will be systematically described. It promises to be a valuable contribution to Oriental study.

[1] It is an interesting fact that Lawrence was an Oxford graduate specializing in Oriental archæology before entering military service in the World War, in which he distinguished himself for his remarkable prowess, in cooperating with General Allenby.

OTHER TRADITIONAL MISINTERPRETATIONS

In the January number of the Quarterly there were brought together several traditional misinterpretations of certain messianic, or supposedly messianic passages. There are several epigrammatic sayings of Scripture that have passed into common maxims, but which have been twisted out of their original meaning. These when brought together—and there may be others of the same or similar sort—make an interesting group of passages. The prophet Hosea uttered many pithy, sententious sayings which have passed into common modern proverbs. Some of them, to be sure, are repeated quite in accord with the prophet's meaning; such, for example, as "They have sown the wind, they shall reap the whirlwind" (8:7), and, "Ephraim is joined to (his) idols, let him alone" (4:17). Another oft-quoted passage from the same prophet, however, is almost habitually turned about: "Like priest, like people." Whereas Hosea said, "Like people, like priest" (4:9). Furthermore, the thought seems to be, neither that the moral quality of the priests will determine the quality of the people to whom they minister; nor that the moral quality of the people will determine the quality of their priests. Both of these statements no doubt have truth in them. But the context shows plainly that the prophet meant to declare that the same fate of punishment awaits both priest and people for their sins. This meaning is even more obvious in Isaiah who seems to have quoted Hosea, "As with the people, so with the priest" (24:2). There will be no privileged class when the day of reckoning comes upon the land. (Ver. 1-3.) People and priests will suffer a like fate.

Amos is scarcely behind Hosea in the use of terse sentences. Frequently this prophet is quoted as saying, "Can two walk together except they be agreed?" (3:3.) The one who thus quotes means that two persons must agree in sentiment or opinion, or theological beliefs, in order to have any fellow-

ship with each other, or in order to cooperate in any enterprise. This, however, is not the meaning of Amos, as the words and the context clearly show. The prophet is declaring that things do not happen without adequate reason. So, "Shall two walk together except they have agreed," R. V.; or (margin) "made an appointment." The Vulgate is probably to blame for this error in modern versions (*nisi convenerit eis*). In our crowded highways people are often found going the same way without previous appointment. Amos lived in a sparsely settled region, where as George Adam Smith suggests, "Men meet and take the same road by chance as seldom as ships at sea."

A very common epigram taken from Habakkuk is usually expressed somewhat as follows: "So plain, that he who runs may read" (2:2). That is, a writing is made so clear that any one, even hurrying by, may be able to read and understand. Cf. Isaiah's "The wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein" (35:8). Habakkuk, however, does not express the idea that the plainness of the writing upon the tablet is primarily that it be understood, but rather that "he who reads (the tablet) may run," with haste to tell the message to others.

We may pass over to the New Testament and select a saying of Paul which has become a common maxim. It is generally quoted somewhat thus: "Avoid even the appearance of evil" (1 Thess. 5:22). This is conceived as meaning that one should not do anything that *seems* to be wrong, even though in fact it may not be so. This is excellent advice, no doubt, for a circumspect Christian to follow. But the apostle, in fact, says no such thing. He wrote, "Abstain from every form of evil" (1 Thess. 5:22). "Every appearance" (εἴδους) means every form in which evil may appear. Since the manuscripts have no punctuation marks, it is difficult to know whether this saying of Paul is a separate sentence of *general advice,* or, whether he meant to join it to the preceding words. Professor Moffatt takes the latter view (following the punctuation of Wescott and Hort and others), and so reads, "Never disdain prophetic

utterances, but test them all, retaining what is good and *abstaining from whatever* kind *is evil.*" So, also Goodspeed: "Do not disregard the utterances it [the Spirit] inspires, but test them all, retaining what is good, and avoiding every kind of evil." It may be noted, incidentally, that Moffatt undertakes to preserve the paronomasia, or "wordplay," in the two verbs κατέχετε and ἀπέχεσθε. These he renders respectively *retain* and *abstain.* Moffatt has made his translation both of the Old Testament, and of the New, very much more vivid and forceful by trying to bring over, into the English, assonance, and other rhetorical sound effects, that frequently characterize the Greek text, and more frequently still, the Hebrew. This may at times be done at the expense of exactness of meaning. But where the figure of speech based on sound can be preserved, without any loss of accuracy of the sense, as is the case just cited, the attempt is well worth while.

E. B. Pollard.

NOTES AND CURRENT DISCUSSIONS

Sir James George Frazer in his learned work "Folk Lore in the Old Testament," a reprint of which has lately come from the press, gives an interesting myth, current among certain African tribes, in which the hare figures. The ancestors of the American Negroes brought many stories about the rabbit and superstitions about the rabbit's foot to these shores. The rabbit too has come to be much in evidence at Eastertime, it has been supposed, because of the prolific character of that creature, its successful race of life against the forces of death. Professor Frazer, in "the Story of the Perverted Message" (*"Folk Lore in the Old Testament,"* p. 20), presents the rabbit in another relation to immortality. It is called to mind by the Old Testament account of the serpent's perverting the truth, and so deceiving the first pair, causing their loss of immortality.

Like many other savages, the Namaquas or Hottentots associate the phases of the moon with the idea of immortality, the apparent waning and waxing of the luminary being understood by them as a real process of alternate disintegration and reintegration, of decay and growth repeated perpetually. Even the rising and setting of the moon is interpreted by them as its birth and death. They say that once in a time the Moon wished to send to mankind a message of immortality, and the hare undertook to act as messenger. So the moon charged him to go to men and say, "As I die and rise to life again, so shall you die and rise to life again." Accordingly the hare went to men, but either out of forgetfulness or malice, he reversed the message, and said, "As I die and do not rise again, so also you shall die and not rise again." Then he went back to the moon, and she asked him what he had said. When she heard how he had given the wrong message, she was so angry, that she threw a stick at him and split his lip. That is why the hare's lip is still cloven. So the hare ran away and is still running to this day. Some people, however, say that before he fled, he clawed the moon's face, which still bears the marks of the scratching, as anybody may see for himself on a clear moonlight

night. But the Namaquas are still angry with the hare for robbing them of immortality.

The hare, in all the African stories, seems to be represented as tricky, unreliable, though clever even to uncanniness, as in all the Uncle Remus stories, preserved by Joel Chandler Harris. The connection of the rabbit with Easter appears clearly to be of another origin.

Doctor W. W. Keen (whose friends have recently extended to him a reception on the ninetieth anniversary of his birth) has an article in the *Review of Reviews* of February last, on the subject "Smallpox—A National Disgrace." The learned and venerable doctor shows what a devastating plague smallpox has been in past centuries. Speaking of even a century and a half ago in America, he writes:

> When a criminal escaped who was *not* pockmarked, that fact was advertised as a means of identification. How the police of today would laugh if a criminal were described as "*not* pockmarked." When John Hancock called the fifty-six members of the Continental Congress to order he undoubtedly faced an audience of whom nearly or quite every one was pockmarked. Diligent inquiry elicits the fact that not a single one of the 541 Senators, Representatives, and Delegates, of the present Congress is pockmarked.

George Washington was badly marked by the once dreadful disease. It is doubtful if a pockmarked man today would be thought of for the presidency. These facts show not only how far science and sanitation have blessed mankind, but, as Doctor Keen's chosen title for his article suggests, that what was once by no means disgraceful may become so, by changed conditions and lapse of time.

Such a generalization may quite as well be made concerning social and political matters. The American Revolution was not a disgrace. War was regarded as about the only possible means of settling such disputes, and time out of mind, has been regarded as a perfectly lawful method among nations.

Today the best consciences of the world have come to the conclusion that war as an institution is disgraceful, and should be forever abolished as an expedient for solving international disagreements. It would have shocked the entire world had Great Britain undertaken to subdue Ireland five years ago by force of arms, as she undertook to subjugate the Colonies one hundred and fifty years ago. The times of men's ignorance God has no doubt continuously overlooked, but now he commands all men everywhere to repent of this war business, as a malignant and loathsome plague, which can be abolished if we only have the will to peace.

Doctor Keen also raises this interesting question:

> Has one man by neglecting to be vaccinated, the legal right to kill 3,164 persons, to endanger the lives of fifteen or twenty thousand more who contract smallpox, but escape death? An emphatic "No" is the only possible answer. Yet one man's neglect to be vaccinated *did* cause precisely those results in an epidemic in Montreal, in a population of only 185,000, as recorded by Sir William Osler. A Pullman porter who reached that city on Feb. 28, 1885, ill with smallpox caused a prolonged epidemic that killed or mutilated thousands and halted the commerce of the city for ten months. The color of his skin masked the character of the eruption, so that the disease was not at first recognized. The direct and indirect losses and expenses are incalculable.

Here too, the facts as to disease may be well applied to the wider area of international relationships. In the present close and complex interlacing of interests between the peoples of the earth, one antisocial, headstrong nation may endanger the health and happiness of millions in all parts of the world, and be the cause of the destruction of life and property that cannot be estimated. If the courts have amply justified the legislatures in passing laws prescribing general vaccination, why should not war be outlawed? And what should be the enlightened judgment of the world with regard to the nation that by its conduct preserves the war-attitude in a day that has made war disgraceful as a means of settling disagreements?

In his inspiring volume, lately from the press, "Man and Message," Doctor John Humpstone has this to say *apropos* present unrest and theological discussion. He is addressing young ministers and his theme is *Athanasius and Controversy:*

As we have taken our way through this troubled, yet stalwart, fourth century career, we have been reminded of the storm and stress of our own times. We are living in an era of controversies renewed. Again the deity of Christ is questioned. Now, even the Scriptures, on which Athanasius mainly rested his cause, are challenged as to their authority. New names designate fresh divergencies. Fundamentalists attack Modernists; Creationists decry Evolutionists. Personal-liberty advocates abhor and seek to overthrow Prohibitionists; the League of Nations and the World Court divide men of opposite views; Socialists are aiming their weapons at Individualists; those who have not are looking with jealous eyes at those that have. It is truly a lively mêlée into which you are going to take part in the conflict of ideas. But a difference favorable to our own time is discernible. The conflict is less embittered than of yore. Freedom to speak as one will, to believe as one is convinced, to worship as one prefers, are now and here assured to all, without danger of oppression, persecution, or peril of life. Excommunication for opinion's sake is rapidly growing rarer. . . Shall the preacher of today, then, make his pulpit a fort from which to bombard theological and economic adversaries? It is perilous so to do. Polemical preaching is rarely effective. It changes few opinions; it oftener causes divisions and stirs up strife. But positive preaching is ever powerful. Hearers willingly listen to a reasoned discourse, or to an urgent, eloquent plea in behalf of an affirmative position. What they dislike is the substitution, in the pulpit, of a wrangler for a witness to the truth.

In a series of articles appearing in *The Independent,* Albert C. Dieffenbach, editor of the *Christian Register,* organ of New England Unitarianism, utters what may be fairly termed a shriek of despair. He had evidently hoped that the late battle between wings in the several denominations known as "Fundamentalists" and "Modernists" would result in a Unitarian defection like that of about a century ago in New England. As the denominations have not split, but have shown a coherence unexpected by him, and an apparent, renewed determina-

tion to live and work together notwithstanding differences of theological view-point, Mr. Dieffenbach is plainly and very painfully disappointed. He attributes the situation of returning peace to the ranks of the churches to a forceful silencing of "the prophets of liberalism," and the leaping into the ecclesiastical, and the political saddle of the forces of ignorance and reaction. He strongly berates the intolerance of those who would force all to subscribe to the same doctrinal statements and sees influences particularly sinister and fatal in the attempt in many States to bolster up Biblical statements by statute law.

We quote a paragraph or two from the last of Mr. Dieffenbach's articles under the title "Religious Liberty, the Great American Illusion."

> Lord Bryce, who knew this country better than any foreign statesman except De Tocqueville, said, forty years ago, that intolerance had largely disappeared from American life. He declared that "in no imaginable future is there likely to be any attempt to repress either by law or by opinion the free exercise of speculative thought on morals, on religion, and, indeed, on every matter not within the immediate range of politics." He could not have been more thoroughly wrong in his judgment of the spirit of the American commonwealth. If he could see this day! A distinguished university president, Frank J. Goodnow of Johns Hopkins, remarked recently that from the beginning we have been in some part an intolerant people. The founders were exceedingly individualistic after their life of tyrannous subjection beyond the seas, and it is largely true that while this was to be "the home of the brave," it did not enter into their purpose to make it "the land of the free." The stern fathers were decidedly their brothers' keepers. Control over conduct was applied severely, to the end of strong individual character. On the whole, punishments that restrained, rather than ethical precepts that inspired, ruled the life of the people, and our present religio-political condition is in no sense a new phenomenon in our national life. Doctor Goodnow deplores it as a very grave danger.
>
> That wise Frenchman, De Tocqueville, was also a realist, and said in 1830 that there was no country in which there was "less independence of thought and less real liberty of discussion than in America." Even thus early he saw what brilliant minds, such as Walter Lippmann, are protesting

against today, namely, the doctrine of the sanctity of the majority, even in matters of private judgment and spiritual belief. Apologists for the majority, says Mr. Lippmann, have argued "that by some mysterious process the opinion to which a majority subscribes is true and righteous," and they "ascribe to the majority of voters the same supernatural excellence which had always adhered to the traditional rulers," when kings were kings by the grace of God. De Tocqueville said the same thing one hundred years ago. "The majority draws a formidable circle around thought. Within its limits the writer is free, but woe unto him if he crosses them. . . He will be subject to all sorts of persecution."

These words are not complimentary. America has boasted of being "the land of the free." But men are not really free till their minds are free. Intellectual freedom should surely be as sacred as physical and political freedom. Nor can America be the "home of the brave," unless Americans have the courage to let men think, even though they may think wrongly; being ever confident that in the open contest between truth and error, truth has nothing to fear, but everything to gain. In this matter Mr. Dieffenbach has done well to speak out—though we may have no sympathy with his wail that intolerance and ignorant reactionism have carried the day in America. On the whole, we believe that religious freedom has gained ground in the minds and in the determination of the people by the recent clashings of opinion.

WHAT'S WHAT IN THE MAGAZINES

"THE HOMELESS LIBERAL"

In *Religious Education* for January, Professor William Adams Brown of Union Theological Seminary, New York, discusses under the title "The Homeless Liberal" some points raised in his mind by having read Professor Kirsopp Lake's "*The Religion of Yesterday and of Tomorrow*" and Professor Machen's "*What Is Faith?*" He finds these two protagonists of diametrically opposite gospels agreeing perfectly upon at least two or three things, namely, that there is no possibility of the radical and the conservative dwelling together under the same spiritual rooftree; that even the tolerably liberal middle of the roader (as, we infer, Dr. William Adams Brown would prefer to be thought of) has no home in either camp, and so is homeless here forevermore. Moreover, the moderate liberal who attempts to put his liberal thought into the old vocabulary, is, according to both Lake and Machen, doing a deceptive and highly unworthy thing.

As to the first position upon which the extreme radical and the extreme fundamentalist knights shake hands, that is, the agreement that they can never have any fellowship with one another, is answered by the moderate liberal by the affirmation, conceded at least in theory by Lake, that theological beliefs are not the basis of church fellowship at all, but *experience*. "The experience of religion and not its intellectual expression ought to be the unifying principle of the church." This might be broad enough as a platform to allow Professors Machen, Lake, and Brown standing-room, without crowding.

Only Doctor Brown would counsel the liberals of all shades to demonstrate a little more clearly that they have had the experience, rejoice in it, and wish to share it with others. Professor Lake himself, while berating the intellectual emphasis

of the creedalists such as Machen, is accused by Doctor Brown of being intellectualistic throughout his book.

As to whether one who has broken with the concepts of the past, should continue to use the old words, reading into them new meanings, Professor Brown asks:

> Exposed to this double attack [of fundamentalist and radical] what has the liberal to say for himself? . . . The ground of his condemnation cannot be that he uses language in a symbolic sense, and reads new meaning into old words, for that is involved in the very nature of languages, and every dictionary is a commentary on the fact and the necessity of such reinterpretation. Professor Lake himself is an example in point. After reading out of the word "God" nine-tenths of what it is ordinarily supposed to mean, he justifies the experimentalist in using it, on the ground that it stands for certain values which he desires to conserve. The liberal's fault therefore cannot be the fact that he reinterprets old terms, but only that he has carried this interpretation so far that it obscures a real diversity of religious experience and brings together in the same institution men who are not really spiritually akin. This is a real danger, and Professor Machen is right in warning against it. If the liberals are to justify their position in the Church, they must show that the charge does not apply to them.

Doctor Brown conceives the heart of the whole debate to lie in the question of the supernatural. Professor Lake thinks of the true Christian as an *experimentalist,* one in constant quest of discovery. Professor Machen bases his faith upon revelation, a word Professor Lake would discard as emphatically as Professor Machen would spurn discovery. Says Doctor Brown:

> The liberal does not accept this alternative. On the contrary, he believes that revelation and discovery are two sides of the same experience; to him evolution is not inconsistent with Creation, but the way in which the Creator, God, brings things to pass. The supernatural is not a series of exceptions interrupting the orderly processes of life and introducing from without something that is not included in the system of things we call nature, but a quality in events and experiences, which science can neither predict nor explain, but which presents itself to the faith of the believer,

with irresistible conviction, as the personal God, revealing his will to man, his child. The liberal believes that such a revelation has actually taken place through the Bible and in later experiences of the Church, and supremely in the person, character, and work of Jesus Christ. Because he believes this, he feels himself at home in the ancient creeds, and rejoices to confess as his personal Saviour the God and Father who is therein revealed.

E. B. P.

THE SOCIOLOGIST MEETS THE MINISTER

Ministers as a group are not conscious of the significance of group relationships. There has been too much absorption in theology and in authoritarian standards developed in periods when static social groupings prevailed, and too little attention to the genetic development of character through social relationships. Nor have ministers looked upon either character or social relations as the result of cause and effect processes.

THIS is the friendly greeting the sociologist makes to the churchman. Some social scientists may be tardy about recognizing the religious facts of life. Be that as it may, the above-mentioned trait is characteristic of many clergy. The great importance of interpreting (at par) religious experience and character control *as phases of social groupings* is clearly expressed in an article, "Primary Groupings as Problem and Asset of Religious Education," by J. M. Artman and Ruth Shonle, in *Religious Education,* February 27, 1927, pp. 153-60.

Students of society will always be grateful to Prof. C. H. Cooley for his treatment of the key place primary groups have in the making of any culture. By "primary groups" is meant those face-to-face agents, such as family, neighborhood, lodge, and so on, which lead the individual to express his whole self in intimate emotional conduct. Traditional society was so constituted that every group tended to organize on a primary control basis. None exceeded the church in this respect. Not so present-day culture. The discovery of big industry and its correlative urban organization, mobile workers, and fleet transportation facilities, have broken down the simple order of com-

panionships of yesterday, and substituted transient, impersonal, relative, and loosely conceived religious loyalties. Most churches still function in terms of primary groups which no longer subsist save under unusual circumstances. For this reason they are out of gear with the structural trend of the times.

Doctors Artman and Shonle would invite churchmen to understand more precisely the *raison d'être* for current religious collapse in parish program. They would also suggest ways and means to promote Christianity in terms of the deepest needs of the new society. They insist that it is the major task of the church to pitch its program to reestablish face-to-face fellowships among folks of all ages, both sexes, every vocation, and all social classes, in a culture whose natural groupings tend to be highly specialized, independent, and competitive. The church should seek to become a personalizing group binder in an age in which folks are flying apart into separatistic, impersonal classes. A cautious reading of this article together with the reference works mentioned in the footnotes would help the minister to understand better the whither of the church and society.

S. G. C.

MORE LIGHT ON THE CANON

In the *Union Seminary* (Presbyterian) *Review* (Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2), January, 1927, pp. 146-158, Dr. Henry C. Vedder has an article entitled "The Origin of the New Testament." This article is a comprehensive and somewhat spirited review and critique of Professor Harnack's latest book "The Origin of the New Testament and the Most Important Consequences of the New Creation" which has been recently Englished. In his accustomed incisive and sometimes caustic style Doctor Vedder weighs Harnack's views in the balance and finds them sadly wanting.

He [i. e., Harnack] advances no new arguments, adduces no new facts, and he even surpasses any former treatise in his groundless assump-

tions, dogmatic assertions without shadow of proof, bad reasoning, and wild conjecture. It is indeed an astonishing performance, considered in itself, and still more so when considered in the light of the author's repute as a historical scholar.

Having got up steam, so to speak, with this introductory criticism Doctor Vedder gathers what he feels are Harnack's five conclusions from the "mass of verbiage":

1. The Gospels were the nucleus of the Canon, and the other books were added or attached to them.
2. The Acts of the Apostles was added to the Canon mainly to prove Paul's apostolic character and vindicate the right of his epistles to stand alongside of the Gospels.
3. The organizing principle of the Canon was "apostolicity."
4. The Roman Church discovered this organizing principle and by it made the first Canon of twenty books which were generally recognized at the end of the second century.
5. The final or "enlarged" Canon of twenty-seven books we owe mainly to the influence of Alexandria, and especially to Athanasius. In particular, Athanasius "saved" the Revelation.

None of these five points can be accepted. The first four are manifestly in error; the fifth is open to less objection, but "somewhat exaggerates the influence of Alexandria and its great bishop." The book as a whole is not attested by fact or logic.

Those who are acquainted with Doctor Vedder, either personally or through his writings, know well that, like Paul, he does not run uncertainly nor fight as beating the air. So in this pungent and vigorous review he attacks in no uncertain terms what he feels an entirely unjustified striving after "originality" sorely at variance with the facts. As a complement to this article a review by Doctor Harnack of Doctor Vedder's book "Our New Testament—How Did We Get It?" would not be uninteresting.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

Professor George C. Foley, a native of Philadelphia, and for years a leader in the Protestant Episcopal Church, has been for more than a score of years professor in the Episcopal Divinity School, Philadelphia. Doctor Foley, in this issue of the Quarterly, brings out clearly the value of the historical prospective in the study of all theological doctrines.

Professor Ralph W. Nelson, of Culver-Stockton College, Canton, Mo., has before appeared in our columns. In this issue is completed his able article on *Experimental Christianity and Rival Religions*. The study of the approach for the Christian God to the non-Christian mind is one of commanding interest.

Professor Morton Scott Enslin, of the New Testament department in Crozer Theological Seminary, calls attention to a much neglected element in the Pauline epistles. Paul the theologian has often obscured Paul the teacher of practical ethics.

Professor Henry Lee Newman, of Colby College, department of Religious Education, writes for the Quarterly a suggestive treatment of the subject of Conversion, a topic that presses for restudy in the light of the recent investigation in the psychology of religious phenomena and of childhood and youth.

Do We Need Any Longer the Supernatural? is the question propounded by the Managing Editor. It will be discovered here, as always, much depends on definitions.

The article *Jesus' Interest in His Own Humanity* was sent to the Quarterly by Dr. Frederick B. Greul, only a few days before his last illness. Doctor Greul held prominent pastorates in New England for many years.

BOOK REVIEWS

Jesus and His Bible. George Holley Gilbert, Ph. D. (Leipzig University), D. D. (Dartmouth College). New York: The Macmillan Company. 1926. Pp. 176.

This interesting and instructive little volume is the outgrowth of a series of talks given to a summer assembly of Bible students. In his preface Doctor Gilbert tells us that it has grown out of a lifelong study of the origins of the Christian religion. One need but recall the many books on early Christianity that have come from his pen since his "Students' Life of Jesus," to feel the justice of this modest statement. The many students who are humbly striving to view the radiant personality of Jesus and make it their own owe a debt of gratitude to Doctor Gilbert's constant and kindly instruction.

The Gospels are not all of a piece. The portraits given of Jesus are not four simultaneous photographs, merciless in their accuracy, but are rather paintings in which the genius and love of many artists may be seen. Accordingly, to understand the way in which Jesus used his Old Testament we must distinguish between what he said and what his interpreters thought he said or would have said. To achieve this end the quotations and references to Scripture are examined under five heads: In the Logia; in the oldest Gospel (Mark); in the unique material of Matthew; in the unique material of Luke; and in the Fourth Gospel.

Here in detail the various sayings are discussed. All the essential features of Jesus' use of the Scriptures are found in the two earliest sources. Rarely did he appeal voluntarily to the Old Testament to strengthen his words. When he did cite the words of the Scriptures it was usually to meet hostile criticism or to answer questions. Even here the use was less than we have been wont to think. To reason and the religious instinct of man rather than to the printed page he invited his hearers. His reverence for the sacred books was great, yet he could distinguish their ceremonial from their moral teachings. Though Doctor Gilbert discovers this attitude in both the Logia and Mark, he feels it more clearly stated in the latter. Again, Jesus found in the Old Testament uniquely personal allusions to himself, yet toward them he was most reserved, and never save once—during the trial before the high priest—did he make the claim to be the fulfiller of any of these words.

In sharpest contrast to this attitude of Jesus stand the Evangelists. While Mark had been content to let Jesus speak for himself without a

word of comment as to how Jesus used the Scripture or what its relation to him was, this is by no means true of Matthew, Luke, and John. As we read Matthew with his great interest in the relation of Scripture to the life of Jesus and with his ingenuity in making the former provide details for the latter, we begin to move away from Jesus and to hear the church speaking in his stead. And for Luke this is even more true. At least twice, almost certainly many times more, we read words attributed to Jesus which can only have been the author's own.

And when we come to John we find both these characteristics, especially the latter, vastly increased. In every case when Jesus speaks we hear the second-century worshiper. But more than that. Matthew and Luke had usually been content to record their interest in the fulfilment of prophecy in Jesus' life. Not so John. For him Jesus' own interest in this field is supreme.

Thus at so early an age traditionalism had started to still the voice of the prophet of Galilee. An ever-widening gulf between Jesus' use of the Scripture and that of his followers was fast yawning. This our author views with grave concern. Never has the church made any real approximation to Jesus' estimate or use of sacred books. The nearest approach has been made by modern historical Bible study. We may get closer, but it will be a toilsome trip. Yet, however rough be the way to this goal, the reward will amply repay. "For all who regard Jesus as the supreme religious leader of men, his estimate and use of the sacred writings of his people can never cease to be a subject of deep practical importance."

To this discussion of Jesus' use of the Bible there follow two chapters of appendix concerned with "other New Testament departures from Jesus' use of Scripture"—Paul and Hebrews.

Since Jesus' use of Scripture as distinct from his later interpreter is taken as the norm, Paul is regarded as the great offender. A bald literalism and crudely faulty exegesis characterize his work. Tragic indeed that the church has followed his lead in interpretation rather than the method and approach of Jesus!

Examples of this faulty and fanciful exegesis by Paul are given, and it must be conceded, fairly given. To each is appended a blistering sentence-paragraph of reproof. One or two examples will suffice. After commenting upon Paul's attitude toward the relative dignity of the sexes, he concludes, "Paul was a heroic evangelist and glorious martyr, but that fact does not justify the crude literalism with which he scants the God-given dignity of one-half of the human race" (p. 131). Or again, after discussing the fanciful exegesis that Paul presents in Second Corinthians with the story of Moses and the tables of stone on Mt. Sinai:

We are compelled to say, therefore, that the simple sense of the story of the shining face and the veil is wholly lost in the apostle's elaborate discussion. He does not unfold the text, but rather folds into it the main thoughts which he himself seems to bring out of it (p. 142).

Strong words these, yet rash indeed would be the advocate who would rise to contravert this pungent but just indictment. It simply goes to prove that Paul's greatness did not consist in his skill in interpreting Scripture. What a solace to the later hosts who in this—but unfortunately this alone—follow in the Pauline stride!

The chapter on Hebrews is happily captioned "The classic in the realm of New Testament interpretation of the Old Testament." It is not inconceivable that Doctor Gilbert has used the word *classic* in a Pickwickian sense.

All in all this little book is a worthy piece of work. It is inscribed "to all who love the Bible without worshiping it, and who see in Jesus at least the finest religious genius of mankind." To all such I recommend it.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

The Achievement of the Master. HERBERT R. PURINTON, Professor of Biblical Literature and Religion in Bates College, and SADIE BRACKETT COSTELLO. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1926. Pp. viii, 206. $1.25.

IN this volume, as in its two predecessors, "The Literature of the Old Testament" and "The Literature of the New Testament," Doctor Purinton has aimed to arouse in students an interest for the Bible. His thorough familiarity with the results of modern scholarship and wide acquaintance with literature and art well fit him for the task. In this volume Miss Costello, an experienced church-school worker, has collaborated.

The purpose of this book is to seek to answer the questions:

What did Jesus do that made him the central figure of human history? Did he so far surpass all others in his deeds and teachings that he will occupy permanently the supreme place in the thought and love of mankind? Did he discover and express the infinite worth of every human soul? Did he show the way, open and free, to all mankind, by which a man could reach God? Did he describe, and show by his own character, what kind of a life the heavenly Father wants every person to live?

The answers to these questions can be found only by seeing what Jesus did and taught. Three sources for knowledge especially have been emphasized—the Gospel of Mark, the Sermon on the Mount, and the Letters of Paul.

At the end of each chapter helps for the teacher have been appended

consisting of directions for written work, oral discussion, and special assignments. The book will be of use in teacher-training classes and for students who desire a brief non-technical approach to the historical Jesus.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

The Self-Disclosure of Jesus. GEERHARDUS VOS, Ph. D., D. D. New York: George H. Doran Company. Pp. 305. 1926.

THE author is Professor of Biblical Theology in Princeton Theological Seminary. To note this fact is to guarantee the wide reading, judicial estimate of sources, and competent knowledge of contemporary theological tendencies required to write the book. It is a painstaking review of recent exegetical opinion concerning the messianic contents of the Gospels.

Nothing of any moment since Baldensperger's "Self-Consciousness of Jesus," issued in 1888, has been omitted. The book, then, is a valuable historical review of a special New Testament problem. Some of the chapters of the book are of the nature of essays on several phases of the messianic question. To list the chapter headings is perhaps the best method to awaken interest in the volume as a whole, and to indicate the thoroughness and range of treatment. They are: Strategic Importance of the Messianic Consciousness; The Denial of the Messianic Consciousness (two chapters); The Agnostic Position: Wrede; The Theory of Prospective Messiahship; The Theory of Development of Jesus into the Messianic Consciousness; The Theory of Purely Formal Significance of the Messianic Consciousness; "The Christ"; "The Lord"; The Son of God (two chapters); The Son of Man; The Saviour; The Messianic Death.

These subjects give sufficient room for critical review of others' opinions, exegetical skill in New Testament interpretation, constructive imagination in forming new hypotheses, and facility of literary expression; and the author does not disappoint in any particular. He has produced a book that repays diligent and prolonged study, and that can be read with pleasure.

As is usually the case, the preface gives the occasion and the motive of the book:

> The time is not so long past when for the appraisal of what was of permanent value in Christianity the alternative was formed: Not Paul but Jesus. At present this formula is beginning to lose its dividing force. The alternative has been shifted back into the mind of Jesus himself; the question, Whether Paul or Jesus? has become the question, Which Jesus? In the consciousness and teaching of our Lord,

a solid preformation of the Pauline Christ has been discovered, and the offense taken at the latter has had to be extended to the former. . . It is the Messianic character of Jesus over which the anti-Pauline interpretation of Christianity now finds itself stumbling. What the cross was in the days of the apostle, the Messiahship is to the modern advanced "Christian" mind, the great rock of offense. But it is a rock not easy to remove, and moreover one from which there is no further retreat backward except into plain liberal Judaism. The attitude toward it determines in the profoundest way the character of the subjective piety that would feed upon the New Testament. Let no one delude himself with the soothing comfort that the controversy is all about scraps of external belief and does not touch the core of practical devotion. With its decision the Christian religion stands or falls. *Tua res, pia anima, agitur!* For the purpose of helping to make this somewhat clearer the following book was written.

Perhaps some readers may ask whether the Christian religion rests on a foundation so unstable as the author seems to suggest, namely, the historical certainty of what Jesus thought about himself. They, too, may have pondered long over the messianic problem, and in consequence hesitate to base their confidence in the perpetuity of Christianity on the discovery from the records of the actual content of Jesus' self-consciousness.

However, the apologetic purpose in no way minimizes the value of the discussion of a theme of perennial interest to thoughtful Christians.

MILTON G. EVANS.

A Permanent Faith: A New Approach. WILLIAM E. HAMMOND. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1926. Pp. 240. Price, $2.00 net.

THE author is minister in the Community Church, Walker, Minnesota. His ministry in the church overflows into the civic community through the *Walker Pilot,* a local weekly newspaper. Through the press he can instruct and cheer and comfort a larger audience than through the pulpit alone. The pastor, whether he wishes it or not, is a walking confessional. In his study, in his home, on the street, people entrust to him their sorrows and disappointments and hopes and doubts. Sometimes they do not confess, they argue, they offer excuses. Minister Hammond discovered that many are perplexed by the uncertainties created by new experiences of modern life. They are not able to adjust their new satisfactions to religious conceptions acquired in early life. Some are discouraged at the breaking down of old restraints, but wish to retain their Christian character at any price; others are glad to give loose rein to desire, and find comfort in breaking of bonds that tied them to Christian ideals. Both groups are like sheep astray, bewildered, in danger. Such Pastor Hammond sought, and without doubt found many. What he has done and how he did it is illustrated in an attractively bound volume entitled "A

Permanent Faith." The book is the result of weekly contributions in the *Walker Pilot,* during the year 1923. They were so appreciated by many readers, that the author was persuaded to gather them in one volume and issue them in permanent form.

Included in the book are articles previously published in *The Christian Work, The Biblical World,* and the *Journal of Religion.* Since the book claims to be "a new approach" to "a permanent faith," the reader of this book-notice may wish to know what to expect, if he purchases it. Well, he will find stimulatingly fresh and suggestive treatment of doctrines cherished by Christian believers. To list them is an invitation to buy. The contents are: A Quest for Reality; The Reasonableness of Faith; The Audacity of the Christian Religion; The Text-book of Religious Faith; The Incomparable Christ; Sins of Unbelief; Christ's Ministry of Healing; The Fact of Sin; The Forgiveness of Sin; Prayer and Providence; The End of the World; The Fatalism of Faith; The Kingdom, the Church, and a Christian; Religious Anarchism; Does the Church Lead? The Spell of His Image.

MILTON G. EVANS.

The Nature of Religion. W. P. PATERSON, D. D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1925. Pp. 508.

IN the spring of 1924 Professor Paterson delivered the Gifford Lectures in the University of Glasgow. This volume is the revision and expansion of the first series of lectures together with opening lectures of the second series. The Gifford Lectures have been a landmark in the history of theological thought. To read them is to become acquainted with the ablest and most devout thinkers. To be invited to join the noble company that has enriched modern philosophical literature is one of the highest compliments that can be paid a contemporary theologian. Professor Paterson deserved the compliment, and the lectures, though revealing nothing essentially new in material or novel in argument, are an attractive presentation of convictions of one of Scotland's ablest theological lecturers. As one of the latest books on the general theme of religion it is worthy a place in a library. The author has familiarized himself with the best that has been written on the history and psychology and philosophy of religion, and with discernment points out the strength and weakness of authors mentioned.

Like a true Scot Professor Paterson is not afraid of "reason" in religion. He is rather proud of the share his countrymen have had in the "many-sided discussion of the central religious doctrine which combines the maximum of speculative interest with the most far-reaching practical

consequences." Throughout his book he gives evidence that he himself is among those theologians that believe that reason is the candle of the Lord, even though a Tertullian or a Luther may use strong language about the feebleness of its light.

To mention three chapters as specially illuminating is not to disparage others. Chapters VII-IX, which treat of *Religion as Duty to God, Religion as Love of God, Religion as Light,* are suggestive discussions of types of religious behavior, and their evaluation. The closing chapter, *Concerning the Truth of Religion,* meets fearlessly the seeming chaos of religious experience in human history, and finds therein a unity and a goal. In this lecture the author becomes a seer, the philosopher a herald of a coming age of righteousness, and not without good reason. The entire treatment of "The Nature of Religion" logically culminates in these fine sentences:

> The golden age of Greece may have its explanation in the religious revival of the preceding period; and the brilliant modern age owes more than it suspects to the deepening of its spiritual life which took place in the Middle Ages, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the other hand, a period of magnificent human effort is naturally followed by some exhaustion and weariness, as well as by a sense of disappointment at the spiritual results attained, and at the oppressive evils that remain in the ravages of sin, sorrow, and death. And so mankind realizes anew its need of God, and is ready for baptism with the Holy Ghost and with fire. It is therefore to be expected that another Sabbath will come round in the midst of the centuries when there will be a general turning to God for comfort and refreshment of soul. And when it takes place, the general mind will again make the more courageous ventures of faith, whereof the most characteristic is to believe that God is the author of a great salvation, and that they who put their trust in him shall never be confounded. Further, this will be accompanied, as in the past, by a fresh experience of the self-witness of God, and of the self-evidence of the truth.
>
> Our hearts, if God we seek to know,
> Shall know Him, and rejoice;
> His coming like the morn shall be,
> Like morning-songs His voice.

> A revival of religion will also be welcome for the reenforcement of the moral energies of the race. The world owes an incalculable debt to the Church, whose faith has molded many of the best men and women who take part in the work of each generation, and has inspired countless forms of Christlike ministration to the children of affliction. Every quickening of the religious life of Europe has increased these contributions, and even more may be expected when next the Spirit is poured out on all flesh. For every great religious period has had something distinctive; and it is probable that the distinction of the next will be the extent to which the energies generated by faith in the God of salvation will be devoted to the service of God in the service of man. It is inconceivable that any great spiritual movement of the future should be bound up with what was called the fugitive ideal of salvation. Rather will it build on the foundation laid by the Reformers, and

work for a Kingdom of God which puts first the spiritual blessings of the gospel, but also includes the highest ideal of human culture and the noblest programme of social well-being. And at the present stage it is difficult to think of a better gift that could be made to the world than to raise up a great body of men who, believing in God with all their minds, should make it the governing and passionate purpose of their lives that God's Kingdom may come, and His will be done, in earth as it is in heaven. And further, if such a generation should arise under the banner of religion, it will be felt that Heaven has again set its seal to the truth of religion.

MILTON G. EVANS.

Reality: A New Correlation of Science and Religion. By BURNETT HILLMAN STREETER, Fellow of Queens College, Oxford, Hon. D. D. Edinborough, etc. New York: The Macmillan Compnay.

ALL who are at all familiar with this author of "The Four Gospels," Editor of "The Spirit" and editor and contributor to "On Immortality," will recognize that he has turned to a very different task in philosophy.

He discusses questions which are of living interest to every human being. In as simple language as he can command he addresses himself to those of no special training in these subjects. His question to be answered is not "Is Christianity True?" but "Does religion supply an answer to the riddle posed by Life, which, to the majority, seems to have the authentic ring?" He does not seek to defend Christianity but interrogate the Universe afresh.

He is satisfied that religion in any or all of its aspects is of little value if divorced from intellectual integrity. Himself troubled, he is convinced that he and others have been asking the wrong questions. He will ask questions of the universe—"Whether Quality as well as Quantity is of the essence of Reality." And he believes he is justified in speaking of his answers as a *new* correlation of science and religion.

Critically he proposes to indicate the inadequacy of materialistic concepts to do justice to the nature of the whole of reality. Concepts are necessary of some sort; naturally the human mind pictures its ideas, the important thing being to choose the picture most illuminating.

Theism pictures the Power back of the universe as in some ways resembling human personality; and this is decried as anthropomorphism; but Materialism pictures the universe as an Infinite Machine, which by analogy may be called Mechanomorphism. This is essentially a myth; attractive, but still a myth. For a machine is an instrument *designed;* the issue of the concentrated intelligence of an inventor. To apply this picture to Nature in anything like the original sense is anthropomorphism in a double sense, and second-hand at that. Now "machine" as a symbol

simply, not corresponding to an actually existent object, is not the explanation of anything.

And furthermore since science rejects the old conceptions of matter, force, and causation; and since the resolution of the atom, and the doctrine of relativity has tumbled space and time into a space-time concept—well, Materialism is hard put to it.

Pure science conceives Reality in terms of Quantity. Quality (value) is the special quarry of art and religion. Religion, like scientific knowledge, is a representation of Reality. For full knowledge of Reality, representations of both kinds are requisite—the quantitative and the qualitative. Accepting religion as a valid representation of Reality in terms of quality, it must be shown that a twofold path to knowledge is necessitated by the human mind. This he proposes to prove in chapter four, the outstanding contribution of the volume. Meanwhile recognizing that Truth is simply "the best attainable representation of Reality in certain of its aspects," he notes that "quality can be known only by being felt" and religion using the methods of Art—such as myth, drama, parable, hymn—represents *Reality* by making men feel the quality which it ascribes to *It.*" The question then is—Since truth means adequacy in representation, may religion be said to be a true representation of Reality?

He affirms there are

> two different and disparate ways by which the human mind becomes aware of truth. There is the method of science—classification, analysis, and reduction to law—which is applicable to all visible and material things; and there is the method of direct intuitive knowledge (and inference therefrom) which must be used to supplement and check the results of the other method *wheresoever there exists that mysterious, invisible something we call Life.*

An analysis of scientific knowledge and what is involved in its acquisition reveals that whatever cannot be classified, analyzed, or explained by reference to general laws escapes, is lost to scientific knowledge. Yet such things there are which possess uniqueness, defy analysis, and refuse to be made an instance of a general law.

All real individuals belong here. "All science can do with such individuality is to ignore it," and thus by its own methods is "excluded from knowing Reality in one of its most important aspects." Preeminently this is true of *Life,* and all it includes which is distinctive of it. Pure science can take us only part of the way where life occurs, and the higher the form of life the greater the inadequacy. So we are faced with the need to ask whether, by right use of the direct acquaintance we have with life, as known in our own experience, we can supply what, by its nature, science cannot afford. This is frankly anthropomorphic; but the author accepts

it as valid when its necessary limitations are recognized. This is a proposition somewhat akin, though with marked differences and a wider application, to Kant's " The Practical Reason."

Such is the message of the volume. The rest consists of the application of this thesis in epistemology, with a vigor and freshness truly rewarding to the reader.

One cannot escape the sense of a distinct slump from the high philosophical level of the earlier chapters in chapter nine and the appendices. " Religion and the New Psychology " does not quite comport with the clear suggestive treatment of " Two Ways of Knowledge," " Creative Strife," or " Science, Art, and Religion." In the first place, the *new* psychology is altogether too varied and indeterminate a thing. And if any one of the variants be fitted to the name exclusively even it (any one of them) may require some violence to religion to make out an agreement; or find in psychology a value for religion.

SPENSER B. MEESER.

Creative Personality: a Study in Philosophical Reconciliation. By RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California. New York: The Macmillan Company.

THIS volume comes as a defense of human values. Its thesis is that reality is a world of persons with a supreme person at the head. As may readily be seen, this is, in substance, like the Christian view of life.

But it is far more and other than an apologetic for the Christian religion. " Creative Personality " here designates a principle of interpretation, and though neither new nor novel, the principle, the author claims, has the highest philosophical value. The idea is that the clue to the interpretation of reality is not to be sought for in the abstract concepts of the sciences, either the mathematical and physical sciences, or the biological, " but in the concepts of the experiences of creative personality."

The ancient sneer against anthropomorphism, likely at once to be the challenge of this view, has little sting for this author; as it is becoming clear that the only alternatives are simply anthropomorphisms at second hand, and inferior for the purposes of satisfactory explanation.

All that any of the sciences can know, or " demonstrate," is that " something has taken place in appearance," " something within the purview of the five senses." " Science cannot logically go behind the uniformity to seek the essence of things without committing itself to metaphysics." And metaphysics is the supreme repugnance of science, that is when it recognizes the difference.

All this with no hostility or caustic criticism of science as such; rather

to point out and emphasize, what ought to be very apparent, that science is continually making metaphysical assumptions (not consciously) and thinking and acting as if these assumptions were as demonstrable as phenomena and had the certitude of demonstration; when in reality they are personifications of the phenomenal order, and often little "above" the animism of primitive peoples; certainly not more than masked anthropomorphisms.

The author's concern is the separation of science from human values and that science may insist even on the denial of their reality. His principle is offered as a basis of the reconciliation of those who hold to the reality of human values and the methods of science which lead to the denial of that reality.

In this spirit the author treats of problems of *reality,* of *thought,* of *value* and of *life;* making a concise and comprehensive application of his principle of interpretation, with fairness and confidence, the latter at times perhaps, in dogmatic spirit.

The method of treatment is direct. The language simple, the reasoning clear, and the brief chapters make easy reading, while they maintain continuity of thought.

The fact that there are thirty-five chapters, each dealing with a more or less distinct problem, forbids the reviewer to deal with them. It must suffice to say that the treatment, while brief and making no pretense to be exhaustive, is nevertheless convincing. SPENSER B. MEESER.

The Eloquence of Christian Experience. RAYMOND CALKINS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 232.

THE Yale Lectures on Preaching for last year appear in this volume. The fact that the Lyman Beecher Course has been delivered by distinguished preachers and teachers of preaching every year, with few exceptions, since 1872, from almost every conceivable angle from which preaching may be viewed, has not prevented an alert-minded pastor from producing a series of lectures at once fresh and valuable. Doctor Calkins, who is pastor of the First Congregational Church, Cambridge, Massachusetts, makes Christian Experience the central theme of the course. The following are the topics of the eight lectures: The Christian Experience and the Quest for Certainty, The Christian Experience and the Ground of Certainty, The Christian Experience and the Christian Knowledge, The Christian Experience and the Christian Theology, The Christian Experience and the Preacher (two lectures), The Christian Experience and the Christian Pastor, and The Cultivation of the Christian Experience.

The lecturer defines religious experience as

> the contact of our whole human personality with God; . . in the deepest sense we mean that we are immediately aware of a reality not ourselves, which is made known to us in and through the actions of the soul. . . Experience thus understood and thus defined, is the final basis of certainty in religion.

Here Doctor Calkins finds "the solid foundation of a truly Christian apologetic and the best basis for a philosophy of the Christian religion."

> The Christian apologist stands no longer on the slippery or shifting ground of a purely historical science. He sees no sense in sham fighting. He has done forever with the old debates about Biblical origins and authorships, about the credibility of Judges and the edibility of Jonah, as if it were on these matters that his faith were to rest.

One may raise the query whether the lecturer does not pass too readily, and without notice, from "religious experience" to "Christian experience." The first any one may have: the second, only those who have come into touch with person and spirit of Jesus Christ.

The lecturer contrasts the Roman and High Church position which finds certainty in the voice of the church, or in an unbroken authenticated priesthood—an authoritative ecclesiastical system—with the authority of experience. He also contrasts the historic Protestant position, which makes infallible history as given in the Scriptures, with experience, as the source of certainty. Neither the Roman position, nor the Protestant, is tenable, he thinks, because infallibilities are no more to be found in the sphere of religion than in any other realm of human experience.

And yet the lecturer regards the discovery of the grounds of religious *certainty* "the gravest problem in our modern world"—apart from Roman Catholicism on the one hand and unscientific Protestant dogmatism on the other. In turning to the New Testament, Doctor Calkins finds the answer to his problem of certainty. Everywhere throughout its pages there is the ring of conviction. The writers were "simply and magnificently sure." "Upon what was that certainty founded?" he asks; for the answer to this question will put the feet on solid ground.

It was certainly not founded on an infallible church, because such a church did not exist.

> The churches of the New Testament, as we all know, were simple "beloved communities" of Christians. They had their elders and their teachers and leaders, but even church organization as we understand it today did not exist. And the idea of an infallible church which alone enshrines the Truth of Christ required centuries to come to its full development and expression. The certainty of the apostolic preachers of the New Testament had no such basis as this.

Nor did the certainty of the apostles rest upon an authoritative creed. They did not regard the Old Testament as the infallible basis of their faith, though they used it freely as foretelling or corroborating Christian truth. The New Testament did not exist. On what did their assurance rest? The author replies, "On their experience of God in and through the historical Jesus."

But the question remains: Assuming that this was a sufficiently solid ground for the apostles, is it sufficiently sure for us today? Doctor Calkins replies that inasmuch as the writers of the New Testament based their certainty of faith not upon this or that historical fact about Jesus, nor upon this or that saying of Jesus, but "solely upon the fact that in Christ men see and find God," so, we may base a sure faith upon the same fact, whether we be certain of the historicity of this or that New Testament statement or the authenticity of this or that teaching. One may doubt, or even reject, "the physical resuscitation of the body of Jesus from the tomb," and yet have certainty, because of one's experience of God through Christ; for says the lecturer,

> The bare fact that the body of Jesus came out of the tomb after three days would have no religious meaning were it not for the further and higher fact that the soul of Jesus manifested itself as a living moral power, took command of the moral lives of men, recreated the timorous and doubting disciples into confident and convinced apostles of His life, and ever since has controlled the moral destinies of the race.

The latter statement is quite true, but one may still raise the question whether as a matter of fact this transformation of the disciples from impotence to moral power would have taken place had they not been convinced that Jesus' body had actually arisen from the tomb.

A careful reading of Doctor Calkins' lectures will provoke thought and cause the preacher to lay renewed stress upon vital religion and the need of the constant reenforcement of the living Spirit.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

Man and Message. JOHN HUMPSTONE. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1926. Pp. 245.

THE subtitle of this volume is "Eminent Preachers who Exemplify Chief Principles of Ministerial Efficiency." The book is made up of the lectures which constituted the Samuel A. Crozer Lectures for 1926, and were delivered to the students, the faculty, and the public, last session in the Chapel of Crozer Seminary.

Doctor Humpstone, Class '74, with keen analysis and rare literary

skill has interpreted the lives and messages of ten of the leading preachers of the Christian centuries, each of which was taken as representative of some quality of ministerial power. The following great characters are presented in the book: "Athanasius—Preaching and Controversy," "Ambrose—Peaching and Administration," "Chrysostom—Preaching and Eloquence," "Bernard of Clairvaux—Preaching and Saintliness," "Massillon—Preaching and Art," "Jeremy Taylor—Preaching and Imagination," "Charles Haddon Spurgeon—Preaching and Evangelism," "Phillips Brooks—Preaching and Personality," "Henry Ward Beecher—Preaching and Public Spirit," "Frederick William Robertson—Preaching and Chivalry." The spirit of this course of lectures reminds one of Horne's Yale Lectures, "The Romance of Preaching." The Humpstone lectures have rather a wider range, and make equally as fascinating a volume.

The lecturer, with unusual sympathy, has made each study a labor of love and fond appreciation; pointing out here and there defects, to be sure, even in the great, yet always disclosing the intimate fellowship between the lecturer and the preacher-subject, that bespeaks industrious study and mature reflection. Nor does Doctor Humpstone forget that he is speaking to ministers as composing a large portion of his audience; and while he does not preach to them, yet out of the wealth of a long and rich ministry in pulpit and parish, the lecturer reveals again and again secrets of ministerial efficiency, as the ten masterful preachers pass in review.

To those who have had no course in the history of Christian preaching, this volume will be a rich contribution. To all who will give themselves the privilege of reading it, it will prove refreshing, edifying, inspiring. It is clear and fascinating in style, ample in learning, and rich in spirit. It should have a very wide reading. The volume is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Henry Griggs Weston, first President of Crozer Theological Seminary.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

A Beginner's Grammar of the Hebrew Old Testament. KYLE M. YATES, M. A., Th. D., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. New York: Doran and Company. 1927.

THIS is an attempt to remove many of the hardships which are supposed to accompany the study of Hebrew; but an examination of the work makes one wonder whether the simplification has not resulted in a robbery of important material. A certain group of educators has told us that we should present difficult studies in such a delightful way that the students will forget the arduousness of their task. The demonstration of this

method has shown too often that the incidental delights which were to enhance study have become the fundamental ends. However, it must be said in fairness to the author that he has not fallen a victim to this danger in his simplifying process so much as to that of omitting information which we consider very valuable. It is always well to remember that simplification is not necessarily education.

Doctor Sampey states in the Introduction that it is Professor Yates' purpose in teaching to give " no task that is not essential in the acquisition of a working knowledge of Biblical Hebrew." This is also the purpose of the book, and he has realized it. The material is presented in logical fashion, with the author clinching one point before moving on the next. The work is not a jigsaw puzzle with the reader wondering why a particular section comes where it does, and then trying to fit it into the general scheme of things. It is rather the orderly laying of one brick upon another for the building of his structure. There is the minimum amount of cross-referencing, which always tends to detract one's attention from the sequence of arguments.

The material dealing with " The Strong Verb " has been given in especially fine style. The different stems with their preformatives and afformatives have been tabulated in such a way that retention of them is facilitated greatly. In some other grammars considerable space is devoted to a consideration of how some forms grew, and what the original was. Naturally it is not contained in this book, for it would be aside from the author's purpose of giving only that which bears directly on a Hebrew knowledge essential to the reading of the Old Testament.

In a language it is the material we forget, or practically forget, which furnishes the background, or atmosphere. This extra information, which perhaps has no direct bearing on the subject in hand, is necessary for our " language sense."

This grammar is an admirable companion for any one reading the Old Testament in Hebrew. It should be of special value to the pastor who is doing a little work in Hebrew. To the student of the language itself, it is splendid, but not sufficient.

A. H. Carr.

Education and the Good Life. Bertrand Russell. New York: Boni & Liveright. 1926. Pp. 319.

Bertrand Russell is widely known today as a philosopher in close grip with the realities of life. Henceforth wherever " Education and the Good Life " is read, he will be known also as a father. If his philosophical speculations have carried a distinct strain of human despair, not so his essays on

child education, for they breathe the cheerful devotion of a responsible parent. The author has much faith in the possibility of changing human nature into foundations of regal character during the early years of child life. He has arrived at this conviction through his experimentation with his own children and by reason of the findings of the newer social sciences. This conviction burns like a gospel in his breast and is the burden of his good news in the book under consideration.

Education for what? If for utilitarianism, then life becomes crude making folks into " machines." If for ornament, then life is snobbish and folks divided into castes. Educational theory that ends with desire for physical good or for mental excellence has lost its soul. Education is for " the good life," for socialized character. Character grows properly as it is surcharged with " vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence."

> A community of men and women possessing vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence, in the highest degree that education can produce, would be very different from anything that has hitherto existed. Very few people would be unhappy. The main causes of unhappiness at present are: ill-health, poverty, and an unsatisfactory sex-life. All of these would become very rare. Good health could be almost universal, and even old age could be postponed. Poverty, since the industrial revolution, is only due to collective stupidity. Sensitiveness would make people abolish it, intelligence would show them the way, and courage would lead them to adopt it. . . Education is the key to the new world. (Pp. 82-83.)

Bertrand Russell is at his best in handling the homely problems that arise in child education in family and school. His treatment of the subjects of discipline, imagination, sex-education, truthfulness, and the fear, sympathy, affection emotions, is clearly articulated to represent " the education we want for our children." The pages are lit up with fitting illustrations from the experiences of " my own boy." The story of " the first year " of child life in chapter three is as interesting as a novel and as instructive as a professional lecture. The writer has learned the happy faculty of melting an academic deduction of psychology into popular reading form without losing its trustworthy value. Here and there perhaps he does run contrary to well-accepted principle. For instance, in his estimation of the competitive form of play, he is inclined to cast such discredit on it, that he sees harm only in open competition. Children should share the game for cooperative ends. " Science has made it technically possible to substitute cooperation for competition, both in economics and in international politics " (p. 132). Not only is this social trait " natural to men and must find some outlet," as the author confesses, but is it not also a necessary motive force for the highest self-expression? Competition need not lead to inculcation in the " war " psychology?

Character education of a formal kind should be complete at six years of age. After that the individual should be equipped to give himself to "intellectual education," the chief qualities of which are curiosity, open-mindedness, belief that knowledge is possible though difficult, patience, industry, concentration, and exactness. Of these, curiosity, the desire for adventure, is the most fundamental of all.

> The building of character should be mainly a matter for the earlier years. If rightly conducted, it ought to be nearly complete by the age of six. I do not mean that a character cannot be spoiled after that age; there is no age at which untoward circumstances or environment will not do harm. What I mean is that, after the age of six, a boy or girl who has been given the right early training, ought to have habits and desires which will lead in the right direction if a certain care is taken with the environment. A school composed of boys and girls rightly brought up during their first six years will constitute a good environment, given a modicum of good sense in the authorities; it ought not to be necessary to give much time or thought to moral questions, since such further virtues as are required ought to result naturally from purely intellectual training. . . I am convinced that the school authorities should lay stress upon purely intellectual progress, and should rely upon this to produce the further development of character which is still desirable. (Pp. 239, 240.)

The subject of religion is omitted in the series of essays.

STEWART G. COLE.

An Integrated Program of Religious Education. W. A. HARPER. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1926. Pp. 152.

AT present many independent organizations function in the field of religious education. The wheel of ecclesiastical progress has turned so swiftly in recent decades that it has thrown off a series of satellite institutions which, though they serve patent demands, carry on without any adequate coordination. The resultant condition spells provincial vision and costly duplication of effort in Christian strategy. Doctor Harper lists sixteen well-known interdenominational, eighteen non-denominational, and fourteen denominational agencies at work in American life. There are many more. Each with its own separatistic policy, program, leadership, budget, makes a heavy burden on the back of post-bellum sick churches. Heal thyself! is the call of the author in "An Integrated Program of Religious Education."

The healing balm is to be found in a sequence of (1) cooperation, (2) correlation, and (3) integration, stages of reorganization. This corrective process must be "radical and thoroughgoing" in order to save Christianity from its congestion of machinery and consequent loss of

vitality. The author would have each denomination's work promoted by means of a "General Education Board," and every local church by its "Church School" under the supervision of a Director of Religious Education, a general administrative staff, divisional superintendents, departmental principals, teachers, assistant teachers, secretaries, pianists and other helpers for the various departments and classes. Each of the subagencies in these schemes is to be endowed with "a new division of labor" to make work lighter and more productive.

The monograph is an attempt to integrate a program of religious education in terms of a bundle of broad principles. The work is, then, considerably simplified. It is doubtful, however, if the author has not omitted from treatment the first fundamental in integration, namely, what are the desired outcomes of such a program? An answer to this inquiry would have much to do with determining the form of organization, the type of leadership, and the nature of curricula. It is conceivable, too, that if the subject had been considered from the perspective of ongoing church institutions rather than from the "principle" standpoint, a different thesis would have been projected. The chart representing "integration organization of the church school" on page 55 will bear careful examination.

STEWART G. COLE.

Working with Intermediates. G. S. DOBBINS, Professor of Sunday School Pedagogy and Church Efficiency. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Nashville: Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention. 1926. Pp. 219.

THE reader has a double assurance that this book is worth careful study because the author is an expert in the field of religious education and because the work is dedicated to his three sons, which indicates that he has had opportunity to test the practical value of his theories and methods.

The logical arrangement of material shows the hand of the experienced teacher. After an arresting chapter on the challenge of the Intermediate Department, the characteristics and problems of the group are presented; the matter of teachers and leaders, principles and methods, plans and material are discussed, and the organization of class and department outlined. The remaining chapters cover the principles of program building, evangelism, and tests of success. In connection with this last topic, ten sets of ten questions each are presented, to check up the success achieved in connection with church interest, home cooperation, teachers, method, evangelism, pulpit efficiency, Bible knowledge, Christian service, and character-building.

The book is conveniently arranged for use in study-classes. Suggestions for investigation and discussion follow each chapter, and questions for a general review and examination are given at the close of the book. A good bibliography adds to the value of the work.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

Baptist Beginnings in Education—A History of Furman University. President W. J. McGLOTHLIN. 1926. Nashville, Tenn.: Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention. Pp. 249.

THIS is the most attractive piece of bookmaking yet put out by the Sunday School Board of the Southern Convention. It is a very interesting story of the struggle of Furman University from its precarious beginnings in 1825, through its vicissitudes of poverty, and the uncertainties as to its very existence, up to the present strength, so finely augmented by the handsome benefaction of Mr. James B. Duke in 1924. The administrations of its five presidents, Furman, Manly, Montague, Poteat, and McGlothlin are sketched in their important features.

President McGlothlin naturally refers, in his preface, to the apparent claims in the title of the book, since it seems to imply that education among Baptists began with the establishment of Furman, apparently ignoring earlier efforts of such men as Morgan Edwards, Isaac Eaton, Burgess Allison, in New Jersey, those of James Manning and others in the establishment of Rhode Island College (Brown University) in 1764, and those of Stoughton and Rice in the founding of Columbian College in Washington in 1822. It is true, however, that there was no stauncher pioneer among Baptists, for education, than was Richard Furman. For years he was like a voice crying in the wilderness. As the first President of the Triennial Convention he did much to swing that body into sympathy with Baptist advance in education. Through his leadership the Charleston Association played an honorable part in these beginnings. Several of the educational pioneers and constructive leaders in the South were at some time closely related to Furman's history.

A minor historical error is observed in the preface, p. 7. Doctor McGlothlin states that Richard Furman and William B. Johnson, both of South Carolina, were the only men from the South who ever held the position of President of the Triennial Convention. Robert B. Semple, of Virginia, was elected to that position (succeeding Doctor Furman) in 1820, and held it at the time of his death in 1831.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

Thirty Years as President of Bucknell, with Baccalaureate and Other Addresses. Compiled and Arranged by MARY B. HARRIS, Washington, D. C. Privately Printed by the Press of W. F. Roberts Company. 1926.

THIS large volume has twofold interest: its biographical character and its collection of sermons. Each is worthy of a separate volume. President Harris is for Bucknell what Wayland is to Brown, McCosh to Princeton, Eliot to Harvard. To mention the President is to visualize an academic institution with distinctive character. Each was a masterful moral force and a creative genius in curriculum building.

It is fortunate that a daughter's love for her father and a graduate's loyalty to *Alma Mater* led President Harris' gifted and cultured daughter to perpetuate his work and words in a worthy way.

The character of the volume is best described in the words of the editor's preface:

> The salient facts of the life of John Howard Harris are a matter of record and history. In the pages which follow, I have tried to add to that record some of the less obvious but equally significant factors of his life, partly from my own knowledge, but largely from the testimony of others.
>
> This I do partly for my own satisfaction as a member of his family; and also for the satisfaction and inspiration of that larger family of his friends and students, his other "boys and girls" as he affectionately called them, to whom this book is dedicated.
>
> My father had planned this book, but he had intended to include only a few of the Baccalaureate sermons. When I came to edit them, I felt that, as a member of the class of '94, I wished my Baccalaureate included and made permanently accessible. Realizing that other alumni might share this feeling, the family decided to publish the entire series, although it made the volume twice the size my father had anticipated. These thirty-one sermons are a unique contribution to the life-history of Bucknell. Vital with the personality of their author, free from creed or religious dogma, they are a vivid, fundamental presentation of the way of life that leads to abiding satisfaction. We shall not outgrow them, for they are perennial. They are not of time, because the truth in them is eternal.

The biographical part of the book is a permanent contribution to the history of education in the United States, and the thirty-one sermons ought to have a place in every library. They repay repeated readings. They have the compactness and solidity of granite, the polish of marble, the sparkle of diamond. To study them is to gain wisdom and strength and courage.

MILTON G. EVANS.

George C. Chase: A Biography. GEORGE M. CHASE. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1924. Pp. 153. Price, $2.00.

HERE is a work of art. The feeling of beauty is satisfied at sight of the book itself. The binding, the paging, the paper, the illustrations, the

printing — all are worthy the love and loyalty that prompted the biography.

The biography is literary art. Simple in diction, chaste in style, progressive in unfolding of theme, the writing is in keeping with the life portrayed. Like a cameo, the features of President Chase are clear-cut. There is no mistaking the portrait. But it is more than a cameo. It is a canvas picture on which is painted with skill the larger background of the best type of village and town life of Maine, and in foreground the childhood and early manhood and the public career of the second President of Bates College. To a large extent Bates College and President George C. Chase are synonymous. The biography is a historical sketch of a college quite as much as the record and appraisal of achievements of a single person. Herein lies one feature of the artistry of the work. To read the biography is to catch a glimpse of human life at its best in home, in public school, in church, in college. One sees, as from an airplane, the farms and churches and schools of Maine, and hears as if by radio the voices of long ago. The explanation is that the biographer is George M. Chase, son of the one whom he portrays. He is Professor of Greek in Bates College. His fitness for the work was evident to the committee that requested him to do it. He wrote because he knew and loved and learned.

> The readers of this biography may well believe that to write it was a labor of love. The joy that came from a sense of a renewed companionship with a beloved father in living over again with him the days known partly from vivid recitals of his experiences in boyhood and youth, partly from personal participation in the events of his later years, compensated a thousandfold for hours of labor at the close of busy college days or during summer vacations.

The moral element in the artistic quality of the biography is the motive originating it. The present President of Bates College, Clifton Daggett Gray, soon after his election, requested the Trustees to arrange for a suitable biography of his predecessor. This creative suggestion of the new executive has given Bates College an immortality in literature, and affords delight to all who are introduced through this biography to a truly great soul.

MILTON G. EVANS.

The Story of Philosophy: the Lives and Opinions of the Greatest Philosophers. WILL DURANT, Ph. D. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1926.

A BOOK on philosophy, extending to nearly six hundred octavo pages, of which some one hundred thousand copies have already been sold, each of which cost its purchaser five good dollars, a successful rival of the "best sellers" in fiction—this is certainly a literary phenomenon of the first

magnitude! It has been welcomed with a chorus of praise, and in one respect deserves the highest praise that can be given it—it is probably the most interesting book on philosophy ever written. The style is admirably clear; it is familiar and lively, without becoming too colloquial. The writer has a lightness of touch that does not become triviality, and occasional sallies of wit give zest to his expositions, while a kindly humor is ever present. A few examples will suffice: "Xanthippe liked to talk almost as much as Socrates did, and they seem to have had some dialogues which Plato failed to record." Speaking of Spinoza: His teacher

> had a pretty daughter who became the successful rival of Latin for the affections of Spinoza; even a modern collegian might be persuaded to study Latin by such inducements. But the young lady was not so much of an intellectual as to be blind to the main chance; and when another suitor came, bearing costly presents, she lost interest in Spinoza. No doubt it was at that moment that our hero became a philosopher.

Of Kant: "He thought out everything carefully before acting; and therefore remained a bachelor all his life long."

Occasionally the wit is illuminating, piercing right to the heart of the matter. As when the author says of Herbert Spencer: "The fondness for order became in him an enslaving passion; a brilliant generalization overmastered him." Or of Santayana, He "believes that there is no God, and that Mary is his mother." It is not often, as in this case, that Doctor Durant borrows his wit, always making due acknowledgment, but he borrows with discretion. This about Bergson is not borrowed and is equally good: "It is harder to be wrong in French than in some other languages; for the French will not tolerate obscurity, and truth is clearer than fiction."

It may be inferred from what has been thus far said, that the book is addressed to the "general reader," and not to students and teachers of philosophy. Of course it should be judged from that point of view, and one who is, as to philosophy, a general reader and no expert, may without temerity express an opinion. The author's plan for such a book appears to be a good one: not to attempt a full, detailed history of philosophic thought, but to "hit the high spots," select the few great names, and group the facts about these. Probably the experts would agree that for the most part a wise selection has been made. And the book contains all that the aforesaid general reader will care to know or need to know. The difference between this and the ordinary history of philosophy is therefore immense, and by just so much grateful; and will be best appreciated by those who have dipped into Ueberweg, or some similar work, and been appalled by the number of names of persons of whom one never heard before and hopes never to hear again.

At the same time, the general reader may have some misgivings, as to whether the knowledge of philosophic thought that he gains from this fascinating book is not as superficial as it is agreeable. Drawing on his memory of what he may have read before, he may be inclined to question the wisdom of Doctor Durant's apportionment of space: seven pages to Socrates and thirty-one pages to Nietzsche seems to a non-professional a somewhat overvaluation of the brilliant German. And the assignment of twelve pages to Hegel and fifty-four to Schopenhauer rather causes one to stare and gasp, and wonder if the experts would subscribe to that rating.

If the general reader happens to be a Christian, he will find a sentence here and there that will give him some disquiet, especially when he finds Doctor Durant insisting that "Jesus stresses the feminine virtues" while Nietzsche emphasizes the masculine. If Doctor Durant has not understood Plato and Kant any better than he appears to understand Jesus, one asks oneself, Is he a safe guide through the mazes of philosophy?

HENRY C. VEDDER.

Richard Green Moulton. A Memoir by his nephew, W. Fiddian Moulton. 1926. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 143.

RICHARD GREEN MOULTON was a pioneer in the new appreciation of the Bible as a great literature. It is true that others before him, like Herder in Germany, and Matthew Arnold, had emphasized literary features of the Scriptures; but Moulton attempted to be a missionary of the new culture for the masses of Bible readers. His "Modern Readers' Bible" has wide sale, and introduced many for the first time to the literary power and beauty of the Bible, which the older approach had successfully obscured. This volume of appreciation by his nephew gives a sketch of Doctor Moulton's early life, his coming to America, and his influence in the colleges and universities of the country through his writings and extension lectures.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

In Time of Sorrow. CHARLES LEWIS SLATTERY, D. D., Bishop Coadjutor of Massachusetts. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 161. Price, $1.50.

WRITING with the earnest desire that his book "may find its way to troubled hearts and bring to them consolation," Bishop Slattery crystallizes in its pages the experiences and thoughts of more than a quarter of a century as a shepherd of souls. Like the scribe instructed in the kingdom of heaven he brings forth from his treasures things new and old. In a book of consolation one would expect to find chapters on such subjects as,

"Submission to the Inevitable," "Intimations of Our Immortality," and "Power Through Sorrow to Help Others." In the present work these are treated with rare power and, in addition, our interest is challenged with such topics as "The Possible Uses of Separation," "God's Need of Our Immortality," "Sorrow Nobly Borne a Gift of God," which are presented with sympathetic insight.

The author urges that the conditions of our existence be frankly recognized and bravely met.

> Life [he says] is a great mingling of happiness and tragic storm. He who comes out of it rich in living is he who dares to accept it all, to face it all, to let it blow its power and its mystery and its tragedy into the inmost recesses of his soul. The victory, so won in this life, will then be an eternal possession.

Fresh and effective emphasis is placed on such abiding sources of comfort as the love and sympathy of God, the power of faith and of prayer, the cross and the resurrection of Christ.

Frank consideration is given to some difficult questions that trouble the bereaved: Will the saintly one who has passed into the other world be so far above those who loved him that they will not be able to find him over there? Can God forgive and restore a dear one who has degraded himself and died in his sin? What does God mean by the ruthless sacrifice involved in untimely death?

Sorrow is presented as an opportunity for sharing the cross of Jesus. A contrast is made between the people who

> having compassed every known device to avoid the inevitable sorrow to which all flesh is heir, and who, having it thrust upon them at last, still protest against it, cursing God because he allows it and filling the air with their groans,

and those who "take the sorrow in and take it consciously in all its bitterness"; these latter are "God's heroes," following Christ, "The Leader of all Men."

Those who mourn will discover in the book a treasury of comfort. The busy minister will find it a mine of stimulating ideas, useful in strengthening those whom sorrow threatens to overcome.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

Pulpit Prayers and Paragraphs. WILLIAM L. STIDGER, D. D. 1926. New York: George H. Doran Company. Pp. 208.

THE brilliant Kansas City pastor issues another book with samples of his pulpit method and style. They are poetic, imaginative, picturesque, entertaining; but they do not strike deep. One who wishes to cure what Sidney

Smith called the unpardonable sin in the pulpit, namely, dulness, might be served by reading this book. One finds much here to entertain, and even to stimulate the mind toward wholesome reflection; but there is little to instruct or to stir profoundly to better resolves. *Entrees* and *hors d'œuvres* are well enough on the bill of fare, but they do not make for muscle and brawn.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

Seams of Glory. PHILIP WENDELL CRANNELL, D. D. 1926. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. Pp. 181.

THE late president of the Kansas City Baptist Theological Seminary has here given twenty-four brief discourses on interesting and more or less vital themes, stitched together loosely, but cleverly, by imaginary threads. The subject matter is wholesome, valuable, and the style bright, engaging. There are no dull pages. They were written first as editorials in periodicals, and have therefore a popular cast, appropriate to such writing.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

Things that Matter Most. JOHN M. MOORE, D. D. 1926. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. Pp. 121.

THIRTEEN sermons or addresses spoken over the radio, and put into a neat volume, make this able collection. They are vibrant with life, and replete with intellectual vigor. Doctor Moore, as pastor and as officer in the department of Missionary Education, has discerned the things that matter most in the advancement of Christ's Kingdom, and learned to lay stress on these. With broad outlook, and statesmanlike grasp, he discusses such topics as "Civilization's Balance-sheet," "The Religious Basis of Social Work," "The Cardinal Heresy," "Fellowship," "When Ye Pray, Say Father," "You and Your Brother," "Religion as Service," "The Way of the Cross," etc.

Doctor Moore is of the class of 1897, Crozer Theological Seminary. Many will be able to receive the same stimulus of these addresses from the printed page that others received when the spoken words were coming over the air.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

The Real Jesus and Other Sermons. JAMES A. FRANCIS, D. D. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1926. Pp. 131.

THE virile pastor of the First Baptist Church of Los Angeles, California, gives us this volume of twelve sermons. They are brief, pointed, and warm of heart. All the discourses center about the person and work of Jesus.

They begin with "A Full-length Portrait of the Son of God," as both "apostle and high priest of our profession," and end with "Arise Sir Knight"—and the commission "Go . . . and lo, I am with you."

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

Securing Christian Leaders for Tomorrow. SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT, General Secretary, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America. Introduction by Robert E. Speer. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1926. Pp. xiii, 179.

THE author says:

A sense of need, springing up in many quarters, for restudying the whole problem of recruting for Christian life-work, is responsible for this book. It is not the product of any one person's thinking or experience. Behind it lies a series of conferences held by an informal group which included the representatives of many Christian organizations (p. vii).

Perhaps this is the reason why it does not seem to be especially vivid in its pictures or striking in its presentation. It is too much a survey of a vast field from which nothing must be omitted.

Every calling which ministers to human need is a Christian calling, and any man who pursues his daily task with the motive of service is engaged in Christian work. An occupation is entitled to higher honor only because it renders greater service. As for the individual, he must be not merely a Christian *in* business, but must make his *business Christian!* A Christian layman is not necessarily one who can lead in prayer or teach in the church school, but one who is demonstrating the validity of the gospel in the commercial world.

Accordingly, securing Christian leaders for tomorrow is vastly more than presenting stirring appeals to young men and women of college age. It is, rather, the wise and careful planning of an environment for human life that begins with the family in the home and continues through the educational institutions. Always this process is aided by the various life and character building organizations, of which the Christian church is of paramount importance. More simply, it is the cultivation of a continuous spiritual atmosphere in which the religious character of human life naturally unfolds.

The concluding chapter will serve as a very adequate summary of the entire book.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON.

Religious Education Music Manual. Compiled and Edited by LUCY CAROLYN MAIN. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1927. Pp. 263.

Conference Songs. Edited and compiled by WILLIAM HOLLOWAY MAIN. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1927. Pp. 77.

THESE two collections of songs edited by father and daughter, and published through The American Baptist Publication Society, of which Dr. William Holloway Main is the Secretary, are issued to meet specific demands. The first of the books is intended to supply week-day and vacation-school needs. An introduction by Doctor Thomas S. Young, Director of Vacation and Week-day Church Schools for the Northern Baptist Convention, presents clearly the place of such a collection in the educational scheme of today, and commends Miss Main's ability and experience for the preparation of it.

There are brought together some of the great hymns of the Church, some that are songs more particularly for childhood and youth; some that are patriotic, some classed as secular, and still others that may well be described as "nonsense" songs. For the purposes of the compilation, doubtless all these have a place. Prayers, responsive readings, instrumental pieces, processionals, recessionals, pictures, and a few suggested games —all add to the variety and value of the book. It is "departmentalized," of convenient size, and mechanically well executed. Leaders of vacation schools, and week-day instructors in religion will find here in one volume much which they were before compelled to seek in many directions.

"Conference Songs," edited by Doctor Main, is intended to furnish temporary religious gatherings with an available collection of good hymns and songs at moderate cost and in small compass. There are sixty-three hymns, and six responsive readings, well selected for prayer and conference meetings.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.

A Righteousness of God for Unrighteous Men, Being an Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans. E. J. FORRESTER, D. D., LL. D. New York: George H. Doran Company. Pp. xiii, 296. $2.00.

THIS volume consists of a running exposition of the Epistle to the Romans. The customary method of the publishing house which issued it in not dating its publications is quite in keeping with the contents. It might have been written at any time during the last fifty years.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

United Churches. ELIZABETH R. HOOKER. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1926. Pp. 306. Price, $2.75.

THIS volume is one of the valuable studies published as a result of the work of the Institute of Social and Religious Research. The material for

the volume was gathered as part of the comprehensive study of American agricultural villages conducted by the Institute from January, 1922, to December, 1925. The extent of this investigation in itself indicates the thoroughness of the study out of which the present volume was developed and the probable worth of the book.

An examination of the pages of the volume thoroughly confirms the accuracy of this expectation. One finds the material arranged under four general headings: Development; Types; Problems; Adjustments. As these headings suggest, there is a sketch of the history of the way in which churches have united for better service, of the various forms of such union, including the federated church, the undenominational church, the denominational united church, and the affiliated church. The third main division of the book surveys the forces which tend toward bringing union about, the several methods of organization, the basis of membership, the kind of services, ways in which finances are handled, the leadership which has resulted, services to the community, relations to other churches, and the methods of handling benevolences. In part four there is an extended review of adjustments of united churches to the different denominations, to State interdenominational agencies, etc., with a closing presentation of the findings which the study naturally offers.

It is at once apparent that here is a volume for informative reading, for suggestive study, and for permanent record. Every one interested in thoughtful and aggressive activities for religious life will need to have a copy available for easy and constant reference.

I may be permitted to add as of interest to all friends of Crozer Theological Seminary and of The American Baptist Historical Society that Miss Hooker spent several days in research in the libraries of the Seminary and the Society in connection with the general investigation out of which this important work has grown.

FRANK GRANT LEWIS.

The Christian Mission in Africa: A Study Based on the Work of the International Conference at Le Zoute, Belgium, September 14 to 21, 1926. EDWIN W. SMITH. London and New York: International Missionary Council. 1926. Pp. viii, 192. Price, $1.00.

THE International Missionary Conference out of which this book has grown is already widely referred to as the Le Zoute Conference, a name which, hitherto little known in America, is likely to become a household word in missionary circles on this side of the Atlantic hereafter.

The Conference is significant in two or three ways. Its significance in part arises from the fact that while it was concerned with affairs in

Africa, it was held in Belgium. One might assume that some suitable place in Africa, itself, would better have served the purpose. Such an assumption omits the fact that Le Zoute offered an appeal to a much wider circle of the friends of African missions and permitted a more detached, though none the less intensive study of the questions under consideration.

The outcome is a very unusual volume. In the first place, it does not assume to discuss missions in Africa; instead, the entire field of Christian activities in what we used to call the Dark Continent is considered as simply the Christian Mission, the singular form of the term emphasizing the unity of the work and the cooperative method of labor implied.

The book is significant also in that it is not merely the proceedings of the Conference, a form of presentation which sometimes is not altogether interesting for the reader. The author tells us that he was

> asked not to produce an ordinary record of speeches and resolutions (for this, it was said, would not be read), but to steep my mind in the material to be gathered from papers and discussions, and then to write about it in my own way, interpreting the significance of the whole. (Preface.)

He adds that he sometimes wished he had not undertaken the task. While those who have had any experience in such an undertaking may sympathize with his feeling concerning the task, probably no one will have any occasion to be other than grateful that he not only undertook it but carried it through to completion.

The outcome is a book on Africa which, while relatively brief, summarizes in an interesting fashion what thousands may well consider concerning the African peoples and the world interest, Christian and other, which is constantly dealing with Africa and its possibilities.

Every Christian leader at least ought to read and study the contents of this book, and those who may not regard themselves as leaders will be profited through a similar experience.

FRANK GRANT LEWIS.

Narcotic Education: Edited Report of the Proceedings of the First World Conference on Narcotic Education, Philadelphia, July 5-9, 1926. H. S. MIDDLEMISS. Washington: H. S. Middlemiss. 1926. Pp. xv, 403. Price, $5.00.

MOST insidious evils have often insinuated themselves into social and political affairs so stealthily that the immense loss which they bring has become thoroughly imposed before the resulting dangers were at all understood. Narcotic drugs are an example of this sort of evil. As yet only a small proportion of the people are aware of the enormity of this curse and have undertaken to attack it. Among those few is Richmond P. Hobson, already well known for his service in related fields of social

betterment. Largely through his single influence the Philadelphia Conference in 1926 was conceived, planned, carried through to success, and the proceedings published.

No limited review can undertake to do justice to the contents of the volume nor of the wealth of suggestion which it offers for those who are ready to cooperate in attempting to lessen the destructive action of narcotic drugs. Not even an analysis of the contents of the volume such as the table of contents outlines may suitably be undertaken in calling attention to the worth of the work. Those who contributed to the Conference and to the printed volume represent the best thought on the narcotic problem from all parts of the world.

As the title of the volume indicates, emphasis is placed on the educational aspects of the use of drugs and the resulting loss to individuals and to the nations. With this there is consideration of the way in which government is related to the wide circle of problems involved. The book closes with a list of the organizations which cooperate and a list of representative citizens who share in the work, with a brief sketch of their views and the institutions which they represent.

If the reviewer, by calling attention to this significant volume, can arouse for the subject discussed new interest on the part of those already concerned for destroying the narcotic evil and can impress the importance of the subject on those who have not yet allied themselves in behalf of mental and physical sanity, the practical worth of what the Conference has undertaken and of the volume it has issued will be better realized.

FRANK GRANT LEWIS.

Acts of Devotion. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 117. Price, 60 cents.

THIS anonymous booklet is one of the many efforts in recent time to aid the inner life of devotion in a day when most men are under pressure of either saying things or doing things. It is hard to be quiet and listen, or to be calm and self-examining. This beautifully printed hand-book of liturgy furnishes a collection of prayers and meditations for various occasions and many moods, and will no doubt assist any one who seriously and joyously wishes to practise the presence of God. It is valuable both for private and public use. While preserving the noble, pure English of such devotional literature as that in the English Prayer Book, this collection voices the best aspirations of the modern generation.

EDWARD B. POLLARD.